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This teaching tool has been developed through the support
of the Touche Ross & Co. Aid to Education Program. The
object of the project is to promote the wide dissemination
and use of the teaching tool in conjunction with any auditing
text currently in use at both the undergraduate and graduate level. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce this
teaching instrument for use in courses of instruction, so long
as the source and supporter are indicated in any such reproductions. This teaching supplement is believed to fill a void
in the available instruction materials for auditing. It serves as
a link between the economics and finance training of the
students and the detailed study of auditing by describing
auditing as an economic service.
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Preface
This teaching tool relies heavily on the
references listed at the end of each section.
The text could be liberally footnoted, but
such referencing would inhibit readability.
Instead, key points in the text are numerically
coded to one of the listed references that
discusses the issue and will, in turn, direct
students to additional sources of information.
Those students desiring additional details,

formal proofs, and graphical demonstration
of the concepts presented are invited to
investigate the references provided; such
formalization of the concepts is beyond the
scope of this teaching instrument. The purpose of these readings, in part, is to encourage the interested student to become aware
of the rich academic literature underlying the
study of auditing.
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I.
Introduction
Before studying the details of auditing, a
clarification of the role of the audit in both the
free market and a regulated environment is
important. Understanding the role of auditing
is facilitated by prior courses in economics
and finance. Your understanding of these
tools will serve as a basis for describing auditing as an economic service. Recent developments in agency theory and information
theory and well-known financial/economic
concepts will be explained and applied to
provide a theoretical framework for viewing
the audit function. An important facet of your
study of auditing is to understand the product. By clarifying the incentives of the parties
involved in the decision to have and to supply
an audit, as well as the attributes of the audit,
you will be able to understand the role of the
audit. As you go into practice or other
business positions, education, or government, you will have an analytical base which
will prove to be useful in
1. explaining audit services,
2. marketing audit services,
3. deciding to contract for audits, and
4. resolving political and regulatory issues
related to audits.
The text first summarizes the observed
demand for and supply of auditing services in
unregulated environments. The framework for
evaluating determinants of demand is then
presented as a set of alternative hypotheses
(tentative solutions to the problem of understanding and predicting the demand for
audits).

Existing auditing literature discusses the
role of hypotheses in furthering theory
development. 1 Hypotheses attempt to abstract essential features of reality that are
useful in predicting what is or what.would be
under a specified set of conditions. By definition, hypotheses are not realistic descriptions of the numerous details which might
affect a phenomenon of interest. Instead,
hypotheses are simplistic positive or objective
statements, typically in IF/THEN form (given
certain conditions, then these events can be
expected to occur). The degree to which IF
conditions accurately describe reality is
unimportant, given that the resulting predictions are reasonably accurate. 2 For example,
it is unimportant that the theoretical phrase
"given a perfectly divisible commodity" in
economics does not describe any real commodity; the assumption merely suggests what
influences are being ignored in forming
predictions. Further, if experience differs
from predictions, it is possible that such differences stem from an attempted application
of a hypothesis with this condition to an
almost indivisible commodity. In other words,
an attempt to apply a theory in a domain
where it is known an assumption is wrong (as
distinct from merely simplified) is likely to
give wrong answers. 3
The hypotheses that describe the demand
for audits have underlying assumptions which
may not correspond to reality or to your perception of the nature of man. Such a lack of
correspondence is not the appropriate cri-

7

terion for selecting among alternative hypotheses. Instead, the degree to which the
predictions of hypotheses are consistent with
available evidence on auditing practices is the
appropriate criterion for tentatively accepting
a hypothesis as valid or for rejecting a hypothesis. The reader, aware of the IF/THEN
form of a hypothesis and its tentative, evolving nature as a basis for explaining and
predicting events, can select between the hypotheses presented or formulate some alternative, perhaps hybrid, theory describing the
market for auditing services. The intention of
this instrument is to introduce the alternative
hypotheses present in the literature which
appear to be consistent with available
evidence on the demand for audits under
varying conditions. The hypotheses represent
the most reasonable explanations available in
existing literature that account for observed
auditing practices.
The hypotheses presented extend key
concepts ingrained in the traditional auditing
literature, as exemplified by the list of four
conditions that create a demand for auditing
provided by the Committee on Basic Auditing
Concepts in 1973: 4
1. Conflict of Interest-conflict between
an information preparer and a user can
result in biased information production
2. Consequence-information can have
substantial economic consequences to
a decision maker
3. Complexity-expertise is often required
for information preparation and
verification
4. Remoteness-users are frequently
prevented from directly assessing the
quality of information.
The astute reader will recognize these conditions in each of the hypotheses outlined.
In addition to describing the three key
hypotheses that explain and predict the
observed demand for auditing services, the
by-products of an audit, which .may be
influential in determining whether a party
contracts for an audit, are described. To
formally support the basic concepts which
underlie the hypotheses presented, a brief
introduction to information economics is
provided.
The supply of audits is described in very
general terms, since the nature of the audit
production function will be studied in depth
throughout the auditing course. The purpose
of this text is to provide a framework to evaluate the implications of observed audit
practices and the effects of changes in the
production function.
Finally, the effect of regulation on the
demand for and supply of audits is consid-
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ered, with analogies drawn to the effect of
more general economic regulation. Now,
inductive reasoning will be applied to observed auditing practices to infer the demand
for auditing services in the absence of regulation.
References
1. Mautz, R.K. and Hussein A. Sharaf, The
Philosophy of Auditing. American Accounting Association Monograph No. 6, Sarasota,
Florida, 1961.
2. Friedman, Milton, "The Methodology of Positive
Economics." Essays in Positive Economics,
Chicago, 1953.

3. Nagel, Ernest, "Assumptions in Economic
Theory." American Economic Review, May
1963, pp. 211-219.
4. Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, A
Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts.
Sarasota, Florida: American Accounting
Association, 1973.

II.
The Market
Evidence
In microeconomics, or price theory, you
studied the allocation of scarce resources to
satisfy competing demands. You acquired
knowledge of the price system of a freeenterprise exchange economy which determines
1. what is produced,
2. how it is produced, and
3. how it is distributed.
You learned that the desire of individuals for
more preferred situations causes market
exchanges which shift property rights to the
highest valued use, thereby guiding productive resources toward an efficient allocation
of their services. Thus, the presence or
absence of output of a given commodity is
the consequence of market forces that reflect
the valuation of the good by consumers. 1
You are aware that auditing services are
currently provided to a large number of
business and government units. This observed production alone suggests that
auditing services are valued by consumers. If
they were not, the resources currently expended for audits would be shifted toward
competing, preferred products. However,
those of you familiar with the Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC), an agency that
regulates the United States (U.S.) securities
markets, are probably aware that preparation
and "certification" of financial statements are
required by the Securities Act of 1934. Based
on this regulatory fact, some people often
assert that auditing exists solely because of
regulation. However, the political process is

not the only explanation for the apparent
demand for auditing. One can observe the
free market prior to SEC requirements. Also,
unregulated segments of the economy today
which are voluntarily audited provide evidence that the audit is valued apart from regulatory compliance concerns. The additional
question of whether regulation is in the public
interest, reflecting the valuation of goods by
consumers, will be answered differently by
each of you depending on your perception of
how political decisions are made.

A. Pre-SEC
The securities acts were not passed until
1933 and 1934, yet in 1926, according to
Moody's Manuals, 82 percent of the firms
traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) were already audited by CPAs. 2 That
percentage had increased to 94 percent
before the commencement of hearings on the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The NYSE
in conjunction with the American Institute of
Accountants [now the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AI CPA)]
developed reporting and auditing guidelines
from 1930 to 1932 and required audited
financial statements in 1933 prior to the
Securities Exchange Acts. The American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) had similar disclosure rules. The exchange rules prior to
government legislation suggest the member
companies valued the audit requirement.3
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Evidence of substantial market demand for
audits is also available in the years prior to
the NYSE requirements. In the 1880s and
1890s U.S. companies were voluntarily contracting for audits. By 1882 the supply of
accountants was sufficient to lead to the
organization of the first society of accountants in this country. By 1886 the American
Association of Public Accountants (predecessor to the AICPA) was formed. That
organization's early attempts to set education
and examination standards for admission 4
resulted in August 1896 in the first certified
public accountants law in New York State. By
1899, 183 public accountants practiced in
New York City and 71 practiced in Chicago,
all primarily involved in performing audits. 5

B. Pre-U.S.
If the scope of market evidence is extended beyond the U.S., audits can be identified
as early as 500 to 300 B.C. in the Greek citystate of Athens. State revenues and expenditures were verified by three boards of state
accountants. 6 Later, auditing developed in
Italy as a means of verifying the accountability of the sailing-ship captains returning to
Europe from the Old World with riches. In
1394, the city of Pisa underwent an audit,
similar in kind to that applied in ancient
Greece. From 1500 to 1850 auditing was
expanded in scope to include the early
manufacturing activities of the Industrial
Revolution. 7 In 1844, the United Kingdom
(U.K.) required audits through regulation,
albeit by stockholders, with or without the
assistance of outside auditors. Yet, rather
than creating a new reporting requirement,
the law simply formalized the common
practice of voluntary company audits. 8 While
it cannot be denied that the law caused audits
in companies which previously did not have
them, the 1844 law was not responsible for
creating the demand for audit services by
corporations; it only marginally increased the
demand for audits by increasing the cost of
not having an audit.

C. Non-SEC
Because the Securities Act requirement
for an outside audit has not been lifted since
its imposition, it is difficult to collect evidence
regarding the persistence of audits in the
absence of regulation. However, audits are
not uncommon in segments of the economy
that are not subject to the SEC. For example,
the municipal sector is not subject to the SEC
requirements, yet auditing of municipalities
by outside parties is typical. While many
states mandate audits, evidence exists that
10

most local units in Missouri, Georgia, and
South Carolina-three states with no such
legislation-voluntarily contract for audits
with independent public accountants. 9 Similar
evidence of widespread voluntary audits is
provided by the fact that 80 percent of the
corporate audit clients of Price Waterhouse &
Co. are not registered with the SEC. Price
Waterhouse & Co. is one of the "Big Eight"
(the largest international public accounting
firms, which together audit 92 percent of the
companies listed on the NYSE and 76 percent
of those on the AMEX). 10

D. Synopsis
The persistence of audits through time in
unregulated environments provides evidence
of the valuation of auditing services in excess
of their perceived costs by consumers.
However, the critical question for an understanding of the audit function is why have
audits been requested, i.e., what characteristics of the product are valued? Users of
audits of SEC companies are likely to differ
from the users of audits of small corporations
and municipalities, resulting in different
valuations of the product attributes of an
audit. However, the three alternative (or
complementary) hypotheses to explain the
existence of auditing, discussed in the following sections, are believed to encompass
the varying concerns of such diverse user
groups.

Questions for Discussion
1. Increasingly complex and extensive
reporting requirements have made the
securities statutes the accountants' fuli
employment acts. Do you agree?
2. If the SEC requirement for auditors'
certification of public companies' financial
statements was eliminated, would the observed frequency of audits decline substantially?

3. The simple existence of continued demand for auditors, assuming consumers
are rational self-interest maximizers,
suggests the audit has value. Critically
comment on this claim.
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Ill.
Agency Theory:
The Stewardship
{Monitoring) Hypothesis
"The origin of auditing goes back to times
scarcely less remote than that of accounting.
... Whenever the advance of civilization
brought about the necessity of one man being entrusted to some extent with the property of another the advisability of some kind
of check upon the fidelity of the former would
become apparent.'' 1
The "stewardship" function of the audit
that is implied in the above quote has recently
been formally analyzed as an agency problem. An agency relationship is a contract
under which one or more principals engage
another person as their steward (agent) to
perform some service on their behalf, the
performance of which requires the delegation
of some decision making authority to the
steward. The money-handlers for the state
were agents of the people of the ancient state
of Greece, the ship captains to Europe were
agents of the investors in ships, and managers have always been the agents of company
shareholders. Audits have been commonly
observed in each of these settings.

A. The Agency Relationship
If both parties to the agency relationship
are assumed to attempt to maximize their
self-interests and if the monitoring of performance is not costless, then good reason
exists to believe that the agent will not always
act in the best interests of the principal. The
self-interest of each individual depends on his
utility function and wealth position, which are
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unlikely to be identical for any given principal
and agent. However, a principal can obtain
some protection by adjusting the price paid
for agents' services.
For example, if an owner expects a
manager to overspend on non-pecuniary
benefits such as a plush office for himself, the
owner will attempt to negotiate a reduced
wage to offset this expected overspending.
Similarly, if the self-interests of an agent are
maximized through charitable activities (due
to a personal utility function that values
giving rather than self-indulgent perquisites),
the principal will reduce the agent's wages to
offset the amount of expenditures to charity
from the principal's resources that exceed the
level of expenditures desired by the principal.
A manager, anticipating that the wage reduction could be greater than the value to him of
the plush office or the pleasure received from
charitable activities, will have an incentive to
contract to not overspend on either a plush
office or charities, or to write contracts in
which he has incentives to not consume such
non-pecuniary benefits. If no such arrangement was possible, the manager would
probably leave his position to locate a more
palatable arrangement with other principals.
In other words, to preserve his compensation
the manager will be willing to expend
resources up to the amount by which the
wage adjustment exceeds the value of nonpecuniary benefits, in order to guarantee that
he will not take certain actions which would

harm the principal or to ensure that the
principal will be compensated if the agent
(manager) does take such actions.
Since the principal's expenditures for
monitoring (expenditures to control the
agent's behavior, including costs of measuring and observing the agent's behavior) are
reflected in reductions of the wages paid to
the manager, the manager's interest is served
by seeing that the monitoring is performed at
the lowest cost. For example, suppose the
manager collects financial statement information for internal decision making purposes.
He would be better off paying the cost of
providing financial statements to the principals and having the accuracy of those
statements attested to by an independent
outside auditor, rather than incurring the
larger cost of having each principal collect
such information individually and adjust the
price paid to the agent accordingly. 2 The
profit figure and resource allocation
decisions of the agents implicit in the
financial statements provide useful performance measures. Operational audits (that
focus on managers' efficiency and effectiveness) and auditors' special engagements
to search for fraud are alternative means of
assessing managements' performance and
the degree to which agents' actions differ
from the principals' preferences.

B. Rational Expectations
An important concept that underlies an
analysis of why audited financial statements
will be demanded is the relatively new economic theory of "rational expectations." This
economic concept assumes that people take
into account all available information that
influences the outcome of their decisions,
that they utilize this information intelligently,
and therefore that they do not systematically
make mistakes. The term "systematically"
means that since people will learn from past
mistakes and experience, on average they
cannot be consistently fooled; in other words,
principals will not be consistently "ripped off"
by agents.
.
The implication of rational expectations
theory for agents is that principals will: (1)
expect agents' self-interests to diverge from
the principals' interests, (2) be able to
estimate the effect of such divergence, and
(3) adjust prices (wages offered) to reflect the
related costs of the agents' expected activities. The ability of principals to protect
themselves through a downward adjustment
of prices causes the agent to generate
demand for monitoring activities. Hence, the

agent rather than the principal is the source
of demand for monitoring activities, siilce
principals are basically indifferent due to their
ability to protect themselves from the risk of
loss perceived in an agency relationship by
merely paying less for the agent's services.
This adjustment capability causes agents to
demand monitoring as a means of avoiding
the downward adjustment of their wages. Of
course, whenever the principals' price adjustment exceeds the costs of monitoring an
agent, all parties could share the savings
realized from contracting for audits or from
using similar means to reveal the agent's
performance. 3

C. The Stewardship (Monitoring)
Hypothesis
While the means of monitoring a steward
can take a variety of forms-owner-manager
involvement, contingent compensation contracts, periodic reports on performance,
etc.-the means of primary interest for
continuous performance reporting is a set of
a company's financial statements. Substantial
evidence exists that earnings announcements
by companies often result in stock price adjustments,4 that accounting information is
related to the market value of a corporation's
shares, 5 and that accounting ratios can be
used to estimate the probability of bankruptcy6 and the risk of owning a company's
stock.l These facts suggest that reported
earnings have information content 8 and are
useful in the assessment of an agent's performance. The use of accounting information
in management compensation and bond
indenture contracts 9 demonstrates the use of
reported earnings in performance evaluation.
From the discussion of agency theory and the
implications of rational expectations, incentives clearly exist for agents to provide
financial statements to facilitate monitoring
activities by principals. However, if the principals do not trust the numbers provided by
an agent they will insist on compensation
(through adjustment of the agent's wage) for
the risk of loss they perceive. Hence, in
addition to providing financial reports, the
steward will agree to provide evidence that
the reported numbers are carefully prepared
to avoid accidental error and are free of
material fraud. The product which provides
this assurance, with acknowledged limitations
with respect to fraud discovery, is the
independent audit.
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While the discussion has focused on the
relationship between owner and manager, as
principal and agent, it is not difficult to draw
analogies to the stewardship relationship
between
1. employer and employee,
2. creditors and shareholders,
3. different levels of management in firms
and agencies,
4. government and taxpayers, 10 and
5. all parties to cooperative efforts in all
organizations.
In other words, the stewardship (monitoring)
hypothesis states that when one party is
delegated decision making power, he has an
incentive to agree to be checked if the
benefits from such monitoring activities exceed the related costs. As one imagines the
potential extraction of resources possible in
the absence of monitoring, e.g., the stealing
and reselling of assets by managers, one can
understand that outside ownership would not
be observed if control mechanisms were unavailable. (The price adjustment demanded to
compensate for such undesirable and expected actions would generate a zero wage
for the agent's services.) Yet, ownership by
numerous outside stockholders and investments by outside creditors are common, as
are audits, implying that control mechanisms
are available to facilitate an acceptable wage
level for owner-managers and for managers
holding no ownership shares. Further, the
growth in audits of U.S. companies from 1885
to 1900 coincided with a substantial expansion in the number of firms with publicly
traded securities and the number of corporate
mergers and consolidations, 11 suggesting that
audits are valued control mechanisms that
facilitate outside investment. In fact, evidence
shows that the likelihood of a firm voluntarily
hiring an auditor increases with (1) the ratio
of total debt to total assets, presumably to
address the steward relationship of management to creditors, and (2) the total number of
employees, presumably to address the
steward relationship of lower management to
higher management. 12 The implication of this
evidence is that the monitoring capability of
an audit is one characteristic valued by
stockholders, creditors, and top management.
Although agency theory focuses on the
expectation that principals' self-interests will
differ from those of agents, it does not imply
that agents are always expected to be evil. In
fact, as already suggested, agents may be
good in the context of being charitable, and
yet not perform in line with the wishes of their
principals. It cannot be denied that a probability of misbehavior-in the sense that
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managers' actions will not always maximize
their principals' interests-exists, and that
means of lowering this probability are of
economic value. These means can be termed
monitoring activities and necessarily include
the audit as one possible means of preventing
or detecting such misbehavior.

Questions for Discussion
1. a. Provide an example of how an employer
could find an external auditor useful in
monitoring employees.
b. If the employer chose not to hire an
external auditor, who would bear the
employer/employee agency cost of this
decision?
c. Would it be the wrong decision not to
hire an external auditor?
2. An owner-manager says, "If the banker
wants a set of audited financial statements, he'll have to pay for the audit."
Comment on the owner-manager's understanding of agency theory.
3. Monitoring contracts will be written
(1) when the agent has incentives to take
actions which will diverge from those
actions preferred by principals, and
(2) when the cost to the party taking the
actions (in terms of price or wages)
exceeds the benefits of such divergent
actions.
a. What is then suggested by the commonality of monitoring contracts and
of audits specifically?
b. Cite agency settings in which audits are
not observed and explain the likely
reason why such monitoring contracts
are not utilized.
4. Give some examples of monitoring contracts tied to audited accounting numbers.
5. a. What are the differences in market setting in the political and private market?
(Focus on the costs of transacting in
both markets.)
b. What are the implications of these
differences in market setting for the
demand for audit services by private
business and government agencies (or
state and local governmental units)?
c. Why would politicians contract for an
audit?
(See reference 10 for a formal discussion of
related issues.)
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IV.
The Information
Hypothesis
An alternative (or complement) to the
stewardship hypothesis is the information
hypothesis. It is argued that investors demand audited financial statements because
they provide information that is useful in their
investment decisions. The common investment decision models in the finance literature
value a firm by computing the present value
of future net cash flows, which have been observed to be highly correlated with financial
statement information. The audit is valued as
a means of improving the quality of the
financial information.
The information hypothesis appears to
overlap the monitoring hypothesis.
Presumably some of the same information
that is useful in monitoring contracts is also
useful to the investor in making investment
decisions. Note, however, that the monitoring
hypothesis would predict explicit contracting
with principals to provide audited financial
statements for monitoring over the life of the
contract as part of the agent control mechanism. This commitment to provide audited
information would be made when the agency
relationship is initiated. In contrast, the
information hypothesis emphasizes that
financial information is needed to determine
market values, which are means of making
rational investment decisions, even in the
absence of the ability to explicitly contract
with the agent.
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A. The Benefits of Information
The literature in finance, economics, and
accounting discusses three major sources of
benefits from information:
1. reduction of risk,
2. improvement of decision making, and
3. earnings of trading profits. 1
Audited financial statements can be related to
each benefit.
Presuming investors tend to be riskaverse, by definition they will demand a
higher return for higher levels of risk, or alternatively they will pay a higher price in the
form of a risk premium to reduce the level of
uncertainty or risk of an investment. Assume
for purposes of this analysis that the risk
premium represents the individual's assessment of how much an audit will decrease the
uncertainty concerning reported financial
information. If the risk premiums of each
investor in a firm were added together and
the sum exceeded the cost to the firm of an
audit, then all parties would be better off if
uncertainty was lowered by issuing audited
financial statements.
Some investors could lower their risk
exposure to an individual firm by forming a
portfolio of audited and unaudited investment
opportunities, thereby decreasing the risk
premium available to offset any sing~e entity's
audit cost. However, the systematic uncertainty as to the quality of unaudited financial

information would increase the variability of
the market as a whole, demanding an undiversifiable market risk premium against which
the cost of auditing could be balanced. In
addition, barriers to diversification can exist
which result in larger risk premiums to
compensate for the unsystematic risk of
unaudited data (peculiarities of a particular
firm's unaudited data apart from its relation to
the market as a whole). The audit can reduce
both market-related (systematic) and firmspecific (unsystematic) risk. 2
An audit is also valued as a means of
improving the financial data utilized by
managers in decision models. An auditor can
improve input data either by finding errors or
by making employees more careful in preparing records in anticipation of an audit. More
accurate data for capital budgeting, inventory
planning, and break-even analysis (as a basis
for production and pricing decisions) will
improve internal decision making. The implication of the numerous decision models
which utilize financial information is that
audited information could be demanded for
management decision making alone. External
use of more accurate data for credit and
investment analysis, labor negotiations, or
regulation decisions will likewise improve
managers' performance.
The third use of information cited refers to
gains from trade by investors with private
access to new information. To evaluate
properly the possibility of audits yielding
gains from trade you need to recall the
concept of rational expectations described in
Section Ill. B.
One implication of the assumption of
rational behavior is market efficiency, i.e.,
asset prices reflect all available relevant
information. Observed behavior over time and
extensive testing of stock markets, commodities markets, and foreign-exchange
markets provide empirical support for the
rational expectations theory. Since asset
prices impound each investor's judgments,
which reflect all publicly available information, there is no way another investor can
utilize such publicly available information to
earn a return in excess of the normal
expected return. The numerous studies which
have searched for a trading rule that
systematically earns returns in excess of the
normal expected return by utilizing public
information have repeatedly supported
market efficiency. The individuals who are
first to discover new information relevant to
the current valuation of a corporation's
securities can trade on that information and
increase their wealth. They will trade until the

price of the corporation's securities adjusts to
the equilibrium price, or expected return, of
the securities, given the information. However, once this information is impounded
in the price as a result of these trading
activities, other investors cannot be rewarded
for using the same information. 3 This is why
the information benefit of profits from trading
is only realized by investors with private
access to new information. The market is so
efficient that it adjusts to new information
almost instantaneously, implying that unless
an investor is purchasing or selling stock at
the very minute a public announcement of
information is made, no abnormal returns will
be realized.
With this background, the audit function
can be evaluated with respect to the benefit
of trading gains. The commonly observed
practice in situations of public ownership is
for management to contract for an audit and
·make the audited financial statements publicly available; this practice was observed prior
to the securities acts. Private corporations
typically contract with the auditor and make
the audit results available to owners and
creditors. The likelihood of managers or any
other party earning excess returns will
depend on the ability to maintain private
access to the audited data. Although the
manager will likely be the first party aware of
the audit results, managers have interests
similar to those of auditors, who are precluded from trading on the information due to
concerns for professional independence.
Managers are concerned with how their
trading gains at the expense of their principals might affect the value of their human
capital as agents. In fact, in the presence of
regulation, managers are typically precluded
from trading on such "inside information."
Further, at public announcement of the audit
results, the price of the securities will adjust
to the information so quickly that no third
party is likely to systematically earn abnormal
gains from trade.
As a matter of fact, no price adjustment
may result from the audit itself: the findings
could be discovered by outsiders at an earlier
date, or the audit results could be replaced by
surrogate information available prior to the
audit. In other words, the announced audit
findings may do little other than confirm
investors' expectations and existing market
valuations. However, the relative absence of
gains from trade on audit results does not
imply a lack of value for audited information.
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B. Information Value
The distinction between information value
and the ability to gain from trade is important.
For example, empirical evidence exists that
unpublished financial results by business
segments (lines-of-business or sub-entities),
as opposed to consolidated financial
statistics, if made available to an investor
would lead to improved forecasting and
better trading rules. 4 Similarly, if information
on audited earnings per share 5 and similar
financial results are obtained before the
market gains the knowledge, excess returns
can be earned. In other words, information
available to an individual and not yet public
indeed leads to above normal trading gains,
suggesting such information has value.
However, the efficient markets evidence
demonstrates that no above normal trading
returns would be expected once the information is publicly available and prices have
adjusted to their expected equilibrium levels.
In spite of the inability to earn abnormal
returns from publicly available information,
evidence exists that public information
releases have value to individual investors
since such releases generally cause updating
of beliefs and clarification of some unresolved uncertainty which may lead to increased trading. Through trading, individuals
can shift to a preferred portfolio investment
position, thereby increasing their utility (welloffness). Each individual has a utility function
that reflects his tastes with respect to the
desired risk and return relationship in the
optimal investment portfolio. In finance
theory the optimal portfolio is at the point of
tangency (where two lines meet) between an
indifference curve (or utility curve) and the
efficient set of investments (or the boundary
of the opportunity set). The efficient set or
boundary of the opportunity set includes all
feasible combinations of investments not
dominated by some other combination of
investments; the boundary merely reflects
different risk/return relationships. The individual can utilize information to adjust his
portfolio investments to a position of greater
utility, whether or not the particular piece of
information resulted in a stock price adjustment. (In other words, the second benefit
described in Section IV. A. holds in the
absence of the third benefit.)
An example of the role of audited data is
provided by research results which demonstrate an improvement in the estimation of
risk through the use of accounting information.6 While this "better estimate" of risk and
expected return does not mean that one
could earn an abnormal rate of return in the
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market, it does suggest that an individual can
reevaluate his investments and shift toward
more preferred investment combinations. For
example, an investor approaching retirement
may prefer a portfolio with a market risk
lower than average, and if he finds he is
holding a riskier asset than he personally
desires based on the "better estimate" of risk
he can benefit from that information. Similar~
ly, a corporation may prefer dividend-paying
corporate investments due to the fact that 85
percent of corporate dividends are not
subject to corporate income tax. Information
on expected returns and their relation to
dividend policy, while unlikely to lead to
gains from trade, can increase the individual's
total utility.
The inference which can be drawn from
the portfolio investment activities of individuals is that while the audit could be
neutral in the sense of not changing the
expectations of the market as a whole, it
could greatly alter the expectations of individuals concerning risk and return. Hence
the audit can improve investment decisions
by an individual.

C. The Public Good Argument
Analysts and regulators claim that since
audited financial statements are available to
nonstockholders at no cost, the value to them
for portfolio rebalancing (shifting to a
preferred investment position based on improved estimates of risk and return) is not
considered by companies when deciding
whether to provide audited information. The
nonstockholders are referred to as free-riders
since they benefit from the information without paying for it. However, analysts and
regulators argue that everyone is harmed by
the underproduction of information that
results from information producers, such as
managers, not explicitly considering the value
of financial data to nonpurchasers. Recognition of the portfolio rebalancing benefits of
financial information which can be unaccompanied by stock price adjustment has led, in
turn, to a claim that regulation in the form of
mandatory information disclosures is required to curb the underproduction of information. This demand for regulation which
arises from the information hypothesis will be
briefly analyzed before turning to the third
hypothesis explaining the demand for audit
services.
Free-riders are considered to be an acute
problem in assessing the demand for information because of (1) discovery problems
(detection of information content is frequently possible by simply observing the actions of

some party who is in possession of the information) and (2) the inability to effectively
exclude nonpurchasers from having access to
informatiofl once it becomes available
through unauthorized resale by purchasers.
Moreover, there is a theoretical basis for
opposing the exclusion of any information
user from access to financial statistics once
they are produced: audited financial statements have public good attributes. (A public
good exists whenever one person's consumption of a good does not reduce another
person's consumption. It is often described in
economics by providing the example of
national defense as a public good.) Since the
use of information by one individual to
rebalance his portfolio does not diminish the
value of that same information to other users
for rearranging their portfolios, efficiency
would seem to dictate that no user who
values the information should be excluded
from access to audited financial statements.
However, if nonpurchasing users are not
excluded from access to financial statements,
the number of free-riders will increase.
Managers may underproduce audited financial data based on the purchasers' demands,
relative to the level of production which
would reflect the total demand for audited
information by users. Yet, the total demand
for audited financial statements, if the demand of all free-riders was measurable, can
be only a slight increase, if any, over the total
production of audited financial statements
observed in the absence of regulatory intervention. The pre-1934 market evidence
(before enactment of the securities laws)
suggests that audited data were widely
produced without regulation. Since financial
statements are either audited or unaudited in
the presence of generally accepted accounting and auditing standards, and purchasers'
valuations obviously are sufficient to motivate
companies to be audited, the marginal effect
of free-riders' additional demand is unlikely to
have a substantive effect on auditing practices.
Not only is it questionable how much
underproduction actually results from freerider/public good aspects of information, it is
also an erroneous claim that regulation is
required to reach the desired level of information production (both the quantity of information available and the breadth of its distribution). Alternative means of increasing the
amount of information produced do exist,
such as using a market mechanism to reach
the target output. In other words, just as a
group of regulators can set a desired level of
i~formation production by mandating specific
disclosures, based on available information

about the demand for a product by nonstockholders, a private coalition, such as a
firm,.can assess this demand and increase the
level of disclosure by slightly altering the
structure of property rights through contract.:.
ing. 7 One means of assessing demand
through contracting is to set a price for the
information made available to nonstockholders. Frequently, regulators claim that this
approach is impractical since it is difficult to
exclude nonpurchasers and therefore difficult
to arrive at the appropriate price which will
encourage the increased information production. Nonstockholders will claim no value for
the information resulting in a low or zero
price if they can acquire the information
without payment.
Having difficulties with nonpurchasers is
not synonymous with being unable to exclude such parties. With effective exclusions
through contracting, enforcement activities,
and appropriate pricing, all users that value
the information will presumably purchase it,
and the free-rider and waste problems
potentially related to public goods will be
solved. Private contracting as a means for
effective exclusion would be possible,
although costly to enforce. Sources of
information to nonstockholders, including
libraries, could be charged for audited data at
a price which presumably reflects the value of
the information to users of the data. Unauthorized resale of the data could be
prohibited. Due to imperfections in contracting and enforcement techniques, some users
of audited financial data could remain freeriders, not having their valuation of financial
data reflected in the information production
decision. However, the total effect of these
free-riders on the supply of information must
be compared with the cost of perfect or
extended contracting and enforcement activities; the market mechanism has failed only
if the benefits from increased information
production exceed such costs.
The extent to which a market mechanism
failure justifies intervention by regulators will,
in turn, depend on the cost of regulation
relative to the combined cost of private
contracting, enforcement, and lowered information production attributable to free-riders.
Since intervention by regulators will involve
an estimate of nonpurchasers' information
(without the added information available from
private contracting with prices set to reflect
each individual user's valuation of the information), it is not obvious that the resulting
level of information production will be
preferred to the level of production in private
markets. 8
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D. Synopsis
The information hypothesis predicts a
demand for audited information as a means
of reducing the risk of investments, improving
internal and external decision making,
enhancing gains from trade, and improving
the portfolio investment position of individuals. Although this hypothesis has been
used to justify mandatory disclosure policies,
it is not obvious that a cost-benefit comparison of available private market
mechanisms and regulation would recommend government intervention.

Questions for Discussion
1. Compare and contrast the information
hypothesis and the stewardship (monitoring) hypothesis as possible explanations
of the demand for auditing.
2. Would the public good characteristics of
information influence the demand for
audits generated from existing agency
relationships? If so, how?
3. a. If asset prices impound each investor's
judgments, which reflect all publicly
available information, why would an
investor expend resources to produce
other information?
b. "The best estimate of an asset's value is
today's price." Comment on the validity
of this statement. .
4. "If stock prices are not affected by the
public release of information, that information lacks value." Critically evaluate
this statement.
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v.
The Insurance
Hypothesis
In addition to the monitoring and information rationales for audit demand, a third and
recently popular explanation of how
managers choose whether or not to have an
audit relates to management's liability exposure.1 Under the securities acts, the auditor
and auditee are jointly and severally liable to
third parties for losses attributable to defective financial statements. Under common law,
the auditor is generally liable to only identifiable third parties. The details of auditors'
professional liability are beyond the scope of
this text. (An in-depth discussion of liability
under common law and the securities acts is
readily available in existing auditing textbooks.) However, the breadth of auditors'
legal responsibilities is substantial, as is the
number of cases litigated since the mid1960s. Investment bankers, trustees, underwriters, lawyers, and managers who have
professional liability exposure for their participation in financial activities involving
disclosure practices have incentives to insure
themselves via auditors' participation. The
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 specifically
provides the defense of "expert reliance" 2 to
any party being prosecuted. The ability to
shift financial responsibility for reported data
to an auditor lowers the expected loss from
litigation or related settlements to managers,
creditors, and other professionals involved in
the securities market. As potential litigation
awards increase, this "insurance" demand for
an audit from managers and professional
participants in financial activities can be
expected to grow.

The question arises as to why managers
and other professionals would look to the
auditors for insurance, rather than or in
addition to an insurance company. At least
four possibilities exist. First, the auditor's
involvement may be so ingrained in a society
that a professional who does not require an
auditor's participation may be unable to
substantiate that he exercised adequate professional care. The absence of the good faith
gesture of independent attestation may be
more likely to imply negligence or fraud on
the part of managers or other professionals.
Second, accounting firms have begun to
hire in-house general counsels, to develop
full legal staffs for defending against professional liability suits, and even to market
the legal services developed for the accounting firm's use. Accountants' specialization in
disclosure problems and the recently
reported successes of their legal branches in
deterring the filing of cases and even gaining
remedies against the SEC suggest that the
auditor may provide more efficient insurance
coverage as a codefendant than an insurance
company could provide as a third party.
Third, the auditor facing a litigation suit is
concerned about his reputation as well as the
dollars he might lose in a settlement. Similarly, managers value their reputation and the
company's reputation as a well-run firm
which distributes reliable information to the
market. While an insurance company will
make a cost-benefit choice of legal defense
versus settlement out of court based on
monetary loss, the common interests of the
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auditor and manager (or some other professional) will insure the proper consideration of
the effect of litigation on the reputations of
the parties involved.
Fourth, the managers of a firm represent
the stockholders, trustees represent creditors,
and, in general, professionals represent
potential claimants in the event of financial
loss from business failure, misleading disclosures, or an investment's overall poor
performance. Auditors have "deep pockets"
relative to a bankrupt or ailing corporation
that cannot pay. Based on courts' inclinations, auditors can provide protection
from an otherwise uninsurable business risk
of investment. The courts have tended to
assume that the auditor is the guarantor of
the accuracy of financial statements to
consumers (investors) who are deserving of
protection from financial loss. The courts
appear to view the auditor as a means of
socializing risk. In other words, because he is
held responsible for business failures, the
auditor in turn shifts this cost to clients
through higher fees and then to society
through higher prices and lower returns on
investment. Risks otherwise faced by investors are borne by society.
The astute reader may recognize this
socializing process to be analogous to the
typical diversification argument that supports
the decision to purchase insurance. An
insurance company, by insuring a large
number of clients, can diversify its risk and
pass on the savings to its customers and
investors. But why is the auditor necessary as
a means of spreading risk? First, evidence
exists that insurance companies do not
adequately diversify professional liability
risks and frequently charge back court losses
directly, through insurance premiums, to
those companies and/or professionals under
coverage. While there is a one-time option to
change insurance firms to prevent the subsequent recovery of litigation losses by an
insurance company, it is unlikely that a party
could continue to obtain liability insurance
coverage at a reasonable price if this practice
of terminating a policy immediately after a
claim was known to insurance market participants. The typical diversification advantage of acquiring insurance company
coverage appears relatively minor with
respect to liability suits concerning financial
statement disclosures. Second, insurance for
protection from bad business decisions is
generally unavailable. The complement to
typical insurance company policies of protection via auditors' involvement can offer a
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socialization of investment risks that are
otherwise uninsurable. 3

A. Overlapping Hypotheses
Of course, the insurance hypothesis
overlaps with the monitoring and information
rationales for audit demand. Presumably
monitoring costs include a means of settling
up for divergent actions of an agent, and the
auditors' "deep pockets" (ability to pay) provide one means of settlement. Since auditors
can be liable for the full amount of losses that
investors may have incurred upon buying
(under the SEC Acts of 1933 and 1934) or
selling (under the SEC Act of 1934)
securities, 4 the auditors have a stake in financial statement reliability. Investors, knowing the auditors' responsibilities, can be
expected to perceive audited financial
statements as having more reliability than
unaudited data, and value these inputs to
investment decision models, including portfolio rebalancing decisions.
Of course, one could argue that alternative
means of monitoring and sources of information exist to fulfill the monitoring and information hypotheses. But only an auditor (1)
can fulfill the expectation that professional
due care involves independent attestation, (2)
can provide the specialized knowledge of
disclosure problems and related defense
approaches developed by in-house general
counsels, (3) can be expected to share
the common interest in the effect of disclosure-related litigation on reputation, and (4)
can insure against business risk in a manner
that socializes risk. The auditor's insurancerelated capabilities imply a separable demand
by managers and other participants in financial markets for auditing, which stems from
the professional liability exposure of auditors.

B. Political Insurance
Another dimension of the insurance
hypothesis relates to the incentives of
politicians to require audits. When the SEC
was established, the government could have
become the target for criticism whenever a
fraud was discovered in the securities market
or a large corporation failed financially.
Instead, the SEC prescribed audits by independent public accountants and extended
the auditor's professional responsibilities.
The claim was made that "adequate disclosures" would preclude a future stock market
crash similar to the 1929 disaster. Yet, no
support was provided for the claim that
inadequate disclosure practices, even in part,
caused the crash. In fact, the claim is suspect
because, as shown earlier, voluntary disclos-

ures in the form of audited financial
statements prior to regulation paralleled
subsequent reporting requirements. However,
the SEC was an overt government reaction
which could be claimed to be the solution to
a clear "disaster." This solution would have
little cost to the government sector if the SEC
could shift responsibility for future, politically
costly events to the private sector. Through
the years the auditors have served as a
convenient scapegoat whenever a Penn
Central, Equity Funding, or similar financial
failure and fraud has occurred. Instead of
asking "why wasn't the SEC aware of the
situation," the focus has become "why didn't
the auditor discover and disclose the
problems?"s
Audit failures do occur, and SEC reliance
on private auditors is most likely the preferred
means of assuring adequate disclosure.
However, in spite of these facts, an added
insurance benefit to politicians accrues from
the current method of regulation. Political
benefits are derived from mandating audits,
increasing liability exposure of auditors to
provide greater remedies to individual investors who lose money in the market, and
focusing attention on audit failures which
place auditors in the defendant's chair.
Government regulators and politicians can
insure themselves against blame by requiring
that SEC companies be audited by public
accounting firms.
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Questions for Discussion
1. The American Law Institute's (All)
proposed Federal Securities Code would
limit damages on non-fraud actions to the
greater of $100,000 or one percent of the
defendant's gross revenues per defendant,
to a maximum of $1,000,000.
a. What would such a limitation on litigation damages from an auditor imply
about the demand for an audit according to the insurance hypothesis?
b. What would the limitation on litigation
damages from an auditee imply about
the demand for an audit according to
the insurance hypothesis?
2. Despite the SEC's statutory authority to
prescribe accounting principles and audit
procedures, in general the private sector
has been permitted to set generally
accepted accounting and auditing standards.
Apply the insurance hypothesis to explain
this action by the SEC.
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VI.
Product Attributes
of the Audit
Regardless of the primary rationale for
the audit, several product attributes are
automatically obtained, all of which will
influence the total number of audits and
related services that are demanded. 1 The
attributes may be considered joint products
or by-products of the audit. Some of the byproducts require further processing, but each
of the attributes shares joint costs with the
audit permitting the auditor to provide the
complementary service at lower marginal
costs than would be incurred if the service
was performed by someone other than the
entity's auditor. 2 How the benefit from the
lowered marginal cost is (or should be)
distributed between the auditor and the client
is a question for future research. However,
regardless of the distribution, the cost
savings benefit society and can be expected
to result in a higher level of demand for
auditors' services.

A. Control Attributes
The control dimension of the audit was the
focus under the stewardship hypothesis, but
is part of the auditor's product even when the
information or insurance hypothesis is the
primary motivation for contracting with an
auditor. The audit itself acts as a deterrent to
fraud and reporting abuses. The threat of
discovery will presumably provide an incentive for the employee not to extract resources
illegally from an employer. Similarly, this
threat deters managers from redistributing
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the stockholders' claims to the creditors, or
vice versa. While managers may not be prone
to illegal acts, what they deem "minor
abuses" could continue without detection if
not discouraged by an independent party's
check on reporting practices.
One such abuse might be the "smoothing"
of income, 3 or the understating of income in
good years and the overstating of income in
bad years to smooth performance measures
over time. In the popular literature this
practice has been termed "window-dressing"
by managers. The efficient markets evidence
implies that stockholders and creditors cannot be systematically fooled by such practices, so why would managers bother to
smooth income? At least two real effects of
smoothing, regardless of stock price effects,
provide an incentive for managers to
"window-dress." The first relates to incentive
compensation practices. Bonus payments are
typically tied to some income number, with a
floor and a ceiling applied through a percentage formula. By smoothing incomes to lie
between the floor (for example, five percent
of the average consolidated capital investment of the firm) and the ceiling (for example,
10 percent of the amount by which the net
consolidated earnings as attested by the
independent accountant exceed the floor),
managers can maximize their bonus
payments. The second real effect relates to
restrictive bond covenants. Through
smoothing activities, managers can have

short-term relief from constraints imposed by
covenants tied to accounting numbers. These
incentives to smooth income can lead to the
distortion of both performance measures and
the information content of financial state- .
ments. However, if managers know the
financial statements are to be subjected to an
independent review by an auditor, the incentives to smooth can be offset by the fear of
discovery by an auditor.
In addition to the control dimension of the
audit which deters fraud and reporting
abuses due to fear of discovery, an additional
control attribute of the audit relates to the
improvement of internal control over
operations. As controls over resource flow
improve, the probability of loss from error or
fraud declines. Similarly, carelessness in
performing one's assigned duties is less likely
to occur or pass unnoticed when one knows
that an external auditor will test whether
these duties were properly performed and will
report on any substantial deviations. Currently an auditor has a choice whether or not to
test internal controls. But the controls must at
least be reviewed, and it is uncommon for the
auditor to do no testing of them. Further, a
separate report on internal accounting controls based on audit tests (or based on an
extended engagement to review controls) can
be issued, itemizing weaknesses in controls
and recommending improvements.
Even in the absence of a separate report
on internal accounting control, the auditor
typically recommends means of improving
existing internal controls through verbal
communication or through a management
letter. In addition, an auditor frequently
suggests ways of increasing the efficiency of
operations, such as changing the physical
lay-out of a plant to simplify the transfer of
goods-in-process, adopting inventory control
models (Economic Order Quantity or EOQ)
and other sophisticated decision approaches,
and constructing cost systems, budgets, and
performance evaluation measures that
motivate personnel. Recommendations on
improving internal accounting control and
productive efficiency are side benefits of an
audit which can result in cost savings in
operations, lower costs for property and
bonding insurance, and less loss from fraud
and errors.

services related to filings with the SEC,
conduct reviews in connection with acquisitions and mergers, examine and report
on accounts and records of employee benefit
plan trusts, and consult and provide other
assistance in connection with various accounting and financial reporting matters.
Professional services by the independent
CPAs which might be considered "non-audit"
in nature and are commonly described in
current proxy statements for SEC firms
include: corporate tax consultation, preparation of corporate tax returns, preparation of
foreign service employee tax returns on
behalf of the company, advice and assistance
related to development and security of
computer-based systems, and various surveys, studies, consultations, acquisition
reviews, and other services. These descriptions typify the products available from the
auditor that have at least some costs in
common with the audit. Once the financial
statements have been examined for fairness,
the auditor has substantial knowledge of a
client's transactions. Such knowledge eases
the planning of corporate tax matters and the
preparation of tax returns as well as the
performance of the other described services.
Studies by regulators and numerous policy
groups suggest that economies are obtained
by using one public accounting firm to audit,
to provide tax services, and to provide
management advisory services as well.
The interest of regulator and policy
groups in the offering of multiple client
services by an auditor stems from concern for
the effects on an auditor's independence of
providing complementary client services. If
an auditor's independence was jeopardized,
the monitoring value of an audit would
decline, as would the information value of the
financial statements. In fact, the insurance
value of the audit would decline, due to the
selection of an auditor who is perceived to
lack independence. While questions of independence persist as complementary services by an auditor have become commonplace, little evidence exists that
maintenance of independence has become a
problem. In contrast to the questionable costs
of multiple services, the economies available
from using multiple services from the same
accounting firm are apparent. 4

B. Complementary Services

C. Reliability Attributes

Current proxy statements for SEC firms
provide a description of the audit services
performed by independent certified public
accountants (CPAs). A typical description
follows: the company's auditors provide

The control mechanisms and by-product
savings which are made available by an audit
are accompanied by other attributes which
improve the reliability of financial statements.
In addition to increasing the trustworthiness
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of the numbers as performance measures for
agents, the audit provides an error check that
makes the financial statements more reliable.
An investor can compare the reliability of
information produced by one firm relative to
information produced by its competitors.
Presumably, stockholders and creditors will
"vote with their feet" by purchasing securities
in a manner that rewards those firms which
issue more reliable audited information. The
amount of the reward will depend on the net
benefits from using audited rather than
unaudited data for decision making. 5 The
"voting with their feet" actions of investors
are more likely to be observed when the price
adjustment process assumed under the
stewardship hypothesis is somehow constrained. The constraint might be a usury
ceiling or a set budget for loans that is
allocated to a fixed group of borrowers
without permitting competition across classes
of borrowers. In the absence of constraints
on price protection and diversification, the
importance of the individual company's audit
to a diversified investor is minimal.
However, as audits are perceived to lessen
the probability of major financial frauds, the
independent attestation can contribute to the
general perception of risk over a large
number of risky investments and affect the
level of savings and investment in the
economy at the market level. 6 The result is a
lowering of systematic risk for investors.
The auditor's function in determining the
fairness of financial statements includes the
enforcement of generally accepted accounting principles and compliance with the
increased number of footnote disclosure
requirements. These attributes decrease the
information risk of any financial data
presented to managers, stockholders, and
creditors and thereby can enhance decision
making.

D. Regulatory Compliance
The regulatory compliance attributes of an
audit cannot be ignored as demand determinants. "Going public" increases the
marketability of a company's securities, but it
is only possible through compliance with
existing audit requirements. If this greater
marketability stems from the ability of certain
firms to distinguish themselves as high
quality firms by means of the audit, then the
audit would be valued apart from the
minimum compliance requirement for the
regulated firm. In addition, going public
typically results in a greater number of
agency relationships, increasing the agency
costs of equity. Therefore, an increased
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monitoring demand for auditing can be
expected to accompany the legislative compliance demand for an audit.
As do stockholders, product purchasers
often wish to distinguish between high and
low quality suppliers, and the audit has been
utilized as an information source to assist in
selecting a supplier. For example, the Department of Transportation in Florida requires
audited financial statements for contractors
bidding on construction. Assuming the
customer base to which a company has
access is effectively constrained by such
customers' restrictions, the audit is a means
of broadening a company's customer base. If
audited statements are a prerequisite to going
public, or to providing a firm's product or
services for certain customer groups (for
example, state agencies), then there is
derived demand for the audit.

E. Synopsis
In the discussion of the stewardship,
information, and insurance hypotheses,
valued attributes of an audit were presented
in the context of each hypothesis. However,
the audit represents a package of services
(with numerous joint products available)
which is automatically received when a party
contracts with an independent auditor,
regardless of the primary rationale for being
audited. Product attributes of the audit include:
1. an ability to deter fraud and reporting
abuses through
a. fear of discovery and
b. improved internal controls,
2. a means of improving operating efficiency by implementing auditors'
recommendations based on a review of
operations during an audit,
3. a common cost contribution toward
complementary services when the same
accounting firm is used for multiple
services,
4. improved reliability of financial information which can reduce unsystematic
and systematic risks of information and
improve decision making,
5. a means of complying with regulations,
and
6. a means of increasing the customer
base to which a company has access.
Each of these attributes will influence the
total number of audits and related services
that are demanded.

Questions for Discussion
1. Provide some specific examples of the
"efficiency benefits" of an audit. Compare
the nature and cost of such benefits to the
alternative of hiring an outside management consulting firm for advice.
2. The SEC has frequently stated its concern
over the possible effect on the auditor's
independence of providing management
advisory services. If the SEC were to
mandate that auditors not provide
management advisory services, how
would such a ruling affect product attributes of the audit?
3. Why would consumers of audited financial
statements value the auditor's enforcement of generally accepted accounting
principles for reporting purposes?
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VII.
Information Economics:
The Costs and Benefits
of Auditing
A substantial body of literature exists
concerning information theory (the
economics of information including its
production, dissemination, and manipulation
in a market context as well as its role in
bargaining and in macro theory) and the
modeling of demand for audits in an information economics framework. The literature
formally supports the basic concepts underlying the stewardship, information, and insurance hypotheses. An introduction to the
terminology and critical concepts explored in
these studies, as well as a summary of
conclusions drawn, will provide additional
insight as to the conditions which lead to a
demand for auditing services.
First, the necessary role of information in
contracting and the incentives for sellers of a
commodity to provide information on the
commodity's quality are described. Second,
the attributes of information that can be
provided are described, as are the effects of
the audit on these attributes. Third, an
overview of all parties' incentives to provide
information supports the classification of an
audit as public, rather than private, information and assists in explaining the authentication value of the audit in the market for
information. Finally, the information concepts
developed to support the demand for auditing
are applied to describe cost fluctuations in an
audit. Since the investment in audit services
in the absence of regulation can be expected
to continue up to the point where marginal
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benefits equal marginal costs, it is relevant to
assess the relationship of information theory
to the benefits and costs to the auditee of an
audit.

A. The Necessary Role of Information
Information theory distinguishes between
two classes of information: (1) foreknowledge, or information that is expected in
advance and determined without further
effort, such as weather information, which
will in time be revealed by Nature herself; and
(2) discovery, or information on hidden
properties of Nature that only human action
can extract, 1 such as a variance analysis of
operations to pinpoint the sources of production inefficiencies in a plant. One of these
types of information must exist to facilitate
contracting.
1. A Basic Premise of Contracting
The theory of contracts requires that the
service contracted be described in a manner
that permits the parties to observe whether or
not the contract has been fulfilled. If the
fulfillment of the contract is not measurable
or observable, the contract cannot be enforced. Obviously the terms of the contract
which make its fulfillment demonstrable can
relate to an outcome, the absence of an
event, observed performance, or measured
performance (either directly or by surrogate).
Performance does not have to be observable,
as long as some performance result or some
event is observable.

In other words, foreknowledge can be the
basis for a contract. For example, a contract
could state that the manager will be paid if
the company does not go bankrupt within a
specified period. However, it typically would
be costly to wait for such foreknowledge to
reveal itself. Although the manager's compensation is contingent on no bankruptcy,
additional losses associated with a bankrupt
operation might be avoided with earlier
detection of the probable failure of the firm.
Further, there is nothing to prevent the
manager from being compensated and the
company from going bankrupt the next day!
Practical considerations dictate that the
fulfillment of contractual terms be subject to
detection at the relevant point in time
(generally during the term of the contract, or
at completion of the contractual service). The
cost of having to wait for Nature to reveal
herself beyond the desired time frame can
deter contracting activities.
Rather than wait for Nature's revelation,
contracting parties will pay for discovery
information to facilitate efficient contracting.
In business, contracts are typically tied to
some form of financial information. The
parties to the contract implicitly determine
the nature of the output or service by their
selection of contract terms.
Each party to a contract will try to
maximize his own utility, and an efficient
contract will consider ways of ensuring that
the output from a contract will be as desired
by both parties. For example, a manager who
contracts to work for a set wage may place a
positive value on leisure and may shirk some
activities that could improve an owner's
return. The owner of the firm being managed
would like to hold the manager responsible
for shirking or to provide incentives for the
manager to work in order to maximize the
owner's utility.
A means of holding the manager responsible for shirking would be to set a desirable
return to the owner as fixed and permit the
manager to retain all of the excess return.
However, the manager or agent is unlikely to
be indifferent to accepting all of the residual
risk of operations. In the face of uncontrollable business risks which cannot be fully
shifted through diversification or through the
purchase of insurance coverage, such an
arrangement will be unacceptable to a riskaverse manager without appropriate compensation for the increased risk. To find a
mutually acceptable agreement, risk-sharing
and incentive effects have to be balanced. 2
Incentives for managers not to shirk exist
in a market economy, regardless of whether
the terms of the contract explicitly restrict

shirking. The first incentive relates to the
securities market. If a manager performs very
poorly and that information becomes known,
rational expectations theory dictates a
downward valuation of the firm's securities.
At some point the firm will become the target
of a takeover and the new set of owners may
well remove the present managers. The threat
of takeover provides an incentive to managers
not to shirk.
The second incentive relates to the market
for management labor. The present value of
the future wage which a manager can get
from alternative employment takes into consideration past and present company performance. Hence, a manager has a strong stake
in the company's performance and overall
success. Not only is he likely not to shirk his
responsibilities, but he is also likely to
monitor the activities of his associates in both
higher and lower management to assure
against their shirking. The importance of
adjustments to future income available
elsewhere and adjustments to current wages
depends on how easily management can be
replaced by competing managers and on
whether the market for management labor is
functioning well. If a manager is approaching
retirement, the prospect of an adjustment to
future income is an ineffective deterrent to
shirking unless, of course, pensions are
subject to adjustment.J
Given that the markets for securities and
for management labor operate to provide
incentives for managers to behave in a
manner consistent with the owners' interests,
are explicit terms in contracts and more
detailed performance measures required?
Applying inductive reasoning, financial
statements and auditing evolved as costbeneficial monitoring devices before regulation in 1933 and 1934 and persist in unregulated environments today. Hence, even in
the presence of efficient securities markets
and a relatively sophisticated managerial
labor market, additional measures of performance are demanded. Further, bonding
covenants requiring external audits are common, as is the use of earnings-based bonus
payments.
Of course, unaudited companies and
compensation contracts which have set
wages are also observed. However, this fact is
consistent with the theory of contracts
presented since alternative sources of information are available to market participants. A
principal may know that the utility function of
an agent includes a highly valued work ethic
and a moralistic attitude which precludes
divergent actions. Or, substitutes for the
external audit in the form of internal audits
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and owner involvement in operations may be
applied in the agency setting. Furthermore,
high-performing managers may enjoy nonwage privileges separate from an earningsbased arrangement which supply adequate
motivation to managers to act in their owners'
interest. Given the fact that some contracts
are not accompanied by the production of
audited financial statements, what factors
determine whether a contract will explicitly
provide for the production of discovery
information in the form of audited financial
data?
2. The Moral Hazard Phenomenon
Discovery information as to the performance of contractual terms will be demanded
in situations in which the moral hazard
phenomenon arises. Whenever the agent in
question, e.g., a manager, may be personally
motivated to take actions other than those
that would have been specified in the
contract by the owner if such specification
had been possible, this phenomenon arises.
The moral hazard phenomenon has been
discussed extensively in textbooks concerning insurance. For example, the moral hazard
from the typical fire insurance contract is th~
increased likelihood that the managers of the
insured company will expend less effort or
money on safety precautions. (The costs of
precautions fall directly on them, whereas the
cost of a fire falls primarily on the insurer.)
The insurance company, as do any principals,
select information systems that balance the
gains from improved contracting (e.g.,
providing incentives to take precautions)
against the increased information costs (e.g.,
the cost of monitoring-making observablewhether such precautions are actually taken).
The presumption in this setting is that
principals cannot adequately price-protect
themselves in a mutually agreeable insurance
contract without some monitoring mechanism. The moral hazard phenomenon
provides a rationale for producing discovery
information. Without such information
production, the total amount of contracting
would decline.
3. The Adverse Selection Phenomenon
The phenomenon identified as "adverse
selection" could result whenever information
is not produced and it is difficult or impossible for one party to otherwise assess the
fulfillment of contractual terms. Consider
the relation between security holders and
managers in the securities market. If security
buyers cannot distinguish high quality from
low quality securities, the market prices will
be adjusted to reflect the average expected
quality of securities available for sale. This
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implies that high quality firms would
systematically receive such low prices that
they would not find it attractive to offer their
securities for sale and would withdraw from
the market. Only inferior quality securities
would remain. Since buyers would recognize
the incentive of sellers of high quality
securities to withdraw from the market, the
investors would adjust the price of all
securities downward to again reflect the
average expected quality. More securities
would consequently be withdrawn from the
market, leaving only the lowest quality of
security available for investors. 4
If the sellers of securities can observe the
relative quality of their securities, there are
incentives for these sellers to take steps to
make it known that their securities are of
higher than average quality. In other words,
the asymmetry of information whereby
managers know the quality of their performance, while principals do not, will cause
total contracting to decline unless discovery
information is made available to principals.
4. Signalling Theory
The steps taken by managers to obtain recognition of their high quality
securities have been formally described as
"signals." "Signalling" is a kind of implicit
guarantee. The seller (or other party giving a
signal) engages in some supplemental activity that would be irrational were his claims not
correct. One signal available to the firm is the
providing of financial statements. Such
signalling makes it possible for more high
quality securities to be offered for sale at
higher prices and reduces the effects of the
adverse selection problem• in the securities
market.5
However, the asymmetry-of-information
argument can also be applied to markets in
which some suppliers of financial statements
are dishonest6 and users of the reports are
unable to distinguish dishonest from honest
financial reports. Given, initially, that all
companies provide financial statements,
dishonest reporting can drive out honest
reporting unless there is some means for
purchasers to identify the honest reports. Expost legal liability for false statements could
serve as a deterrent, but a means of discovering· the falsity of those reports not revealed by
Nature is required.
The institution which arose to counteract
the effects of uncertainty about the quality (or
reliability) of financial reporting was the
independent audit. Since the auditing profession faced the same potential problem of
dishonest auditors driving out honest
auditors in the absence of some observable

means of distinguishing between the two
groups, licensing practices arose with certification to indicate the attainment of a
recognized level of proficiency. A code of
ethics was created and enforced to deter
subsequent abuse.? Also, the legal liability of
professional auditors under common law
(and later under the securities acts) serves as
an additional deterrent to dishonesty.
The perceived importance of the quality
differentiation role of auditing is supported in
numerous surveys of shareholders. For example, 94 percent of 711 investors in Australia
stated they would buy shares in a public
company only if it was audited. In addition, 93
percent of this same random sample from
stockholders of two major Australian companies stated they would expect the auditor
to be a member of a professional accounting
society as evidence of his competence. 8
5. Synopsis
This section introduced the concepts of
essential elements for contract enforcement,
shortcomings of foreknowledge as a basis for
contracting, and consequent demands for
discovery information. The requirement that a
mutually acceptable agreement balance both
risk-sharing and incentive effects implies that
a role exists for contract terms tied to
performance measures. The efficient
securities market and the operation of the
managerial labor market are admitted to
constrain the degree to which agents' actions
can diverge from principals' preferences.
However, such constraints are inadequate
substitutes for alternative performance
measures in most agency relationships based
on the observed demand for audited financial
information. The factors that predict a demand for discovery information on performance include the existence of a moral
hazard situation and the asymmetry of
information between contracting parties. The
demand for discovery information in the form
of audited financial statements is a consequence of the effects of the adverse selection
phenomenon upon the securities market due
to the signalling behavior of dishonest
managers. The adverse selection
phenomenon is also applied to the market for
auditors to explain the observed professional
activities of licensing and self-regulation.
Having discussed the necessary role of
information, the attributes of the information
typically provided for contracting will be
described. An understanding of how these
attributes are enhanced by the performance
of an audit will clarify the value of the audit as
described by information theory.

B. Information Attributes
A number of attributes affect the value of
information to potential users or producers.
The certainty of the information, the extent of
its dissemination, its applicability (i.e., particular to a single economic agent or of
general applicability), its content (i.e., is the
information about the physical environment
or about the strategies or behavior of other
individuals; does it concern tastes, resources,
production functions, or market characteristics like price and quality), and its decisionrelevance all affect the economic significance
of information. 9 Three major attributes of
information have been the center of analysis
in applications of information theory to
accounting: noise, bias, and fineness.
Noise refers to unintentional error in the
accounting process. The error reduces the
reliability of accounting information (given
that some reliability is expected). Specifically,
noise reduces the degree to which accounting messages correspond to underlying
economic events. The more noise in a piece
of information, the less useful it is as a basis
for assessing performance. Whenever the
ability to assess the fulfillment of a contract's
terms is lessened due to noise in the selected
performance measures, the total set of
contracting opportunities found to be mutually acceptable will be reduced. Further, the
inability to clearly distinguish noise from valid
information contributes to the adverse selection problem in the markets for securities and
commodities.
Bias refers to managers' incentive to
"window-dress" financial statements in their
favor. If compensation is tied to earnings,
managers would have incentives to overstate
performance measures (until discovery) in
order to be systematically overpaid. Or, if
managers and their principals are facing
retaliation for large profits by regulators, an
incentive would exist to understate performance measures. (Although the theft of
assets by management can result in the
misstatement of financial position, such theft
is not defined as a source of biased information. Theft is a source of physical asset loss,
the incorrect accounting of which would bias
the financial statements.)
The fineness of accounting information
relates to its information content in the
absence of unintentional errors. A reporting
function is finer than another coarser reporting function if it provides more information
to the owner of an entity. 10 An example is
provided by comparing the aggregate, rather
coarse account titles that were once permissible in financial reporting (like an Appropria31

tion for Contingencies) to the detail now
required in finer, more informative titles (such
as Appropriation for Litigation and Appropriation for Contract Disputes).
Based on analytical evaluations of the
three major attributes of accounting information, the literature supports several conclusions concerning the relationship of the
audit to each attribute. The first of these
conclusions relates to a necessary role for the
audit. It is demonstrable that only a pure
wage agreement (a set dollar compensation
with no dependence on performance
measures) will induce managers to report
truthfully, i.e., without bias. Yet, a pure wage
payment provides neither incentives for an
agent to perform nor a basis for risk-sharing
between parties to a contract. In a moral
hazard situation the optimum contract will try
to balance risk-sharing and incentive effects.
To facilitate this balance, some auditing
services and a related penalty function tied to
the discovery of bias in reporting are required
to decrease the probable bias of the information produced by managers. 11
The second conclusion relates to the
audit's effect on signalling. There is a
signalling effect in a manager's selection of
reporting methods. Stockholders may utilize
the fineness of the reporting method chosen
as one of the criteria for judging managers.
The auditor's certification as to the conformity of financial statements with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
provides a minimum signal of fineness which,
alone, gives the audit function value.
However, additional signals are emitted by
managers' selections of reporting techniques
within GAAP, and the auditor provides the
service of attesting to the overall fairness of
the footnote description of key accounting
policies. 12 For example, if an owner is
primarily interested in total earnings as a
basis for predicting a company's future cash
flows, LIFO may provide more information to
the owner during a period of inflation than a
FIFO inventory valuation method. Similarly,
more detailed data provided in the form of
additional and supplementary disclosures
and the voluntary provision of management
forecasts are likely to provide more information to the owners and signal good performance by the managers. In contrast, coarser
disclosures are more likely to be issued by
managers who are hedging themselves from
the owners' detection of poor performance.
The third conclusion relates to noise.
Auditors will require the correction of accidental errors which are material, when
discovered through the audit process. The
correction of errors will lower the noise in
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accounting information. Even if no errors are
discovered, the principals are assured by the
auditor that there is no material noise in the
financial statements. The availability of a less
noisy measure of performance will increase
the total set of contracting opportunities and
will be a deterrent to the adverse selection
phenomenon.
The fourth conclusion relates to the
overall benefits of lowered noise, bias, and
coarseness in accounting data that accrue
from an audit. The improved quality of
financial reports will improve managers'
decision making since the risk and return of
investment projects can be more accurately
assessed. To the extent that the audit
facilitates the use of wage schemes tied to
performance measures, it can motivate
managers to expend more effort. In fact, firms
utilizing other than pure wage contracts have
performed better in the stock market, implying favorable effects on real output. 13
Having introduced the valued attributes of
information and how they are enhanced by an
audit, the question arises as to who produces
the audited financial statements and whether
they are typically produced as private or as
public information.

C. Private and Public Information
Production
The incentives of private individuals to
produce information for their own use or for
distribution to others stem from the ability to
speculate and/or resell the information. The
resale or publicizing of the information is the
means of making the information sufficiently
public to obtain the price shift necessary to
receive trading gains. In addition to the mere
transfer of resources among traders (which
results in distributive gains and losses),
productive gains can be realized by the
individual from investing in more productive
opportunities. Further, as privately produced
information is disseminated, other individuals
will adapt to the information and will shift
their commitment of resources toward more
productive investments. Distributive gains
and losses do not affect the total wealth, but
simply shift resources away from those
without information to individuals with information. In contrast, productive gains enhance
the total allocation of resources.
As opposed to the eventual publicizing of
private information, public information results
in an immediate adjustment of prices and a
shift in productive resources. Given the
efficiency of the securities market, little if any
value accrues to the private individual from
direct trading activities on public information.

However, the perceived relative gain from
taking speculative positions is not as apparent. As differences in tastes or beliefs
concerning economic activities arise, people
are likely to believe that such disagreements
in taste really stem from their own possession
of superior information. The perception that
they are right will encourage them to invest
and to then expend resources generating
public information to convince others of their
opinion. The same thought process results in
the production of public information by
parties holding opposite opinions. In addition
to the parties honestly wishing to convey
public information in support of their own
opinions, fraud perpetrators will expend
resources to convey inauthentic public information in an attempt to reap profits. While
disincentives to producing fraudulent information exist (in the form of criminal
penalties), such production can be expected
to occur, although not extensively.
The effect of perceived relative gains and
desired profits by both honest and fraudulent
information producers is that the production
of public information tends to be excessive
relative to its social value. An implication of
this excessive production is that an independent attestation as to the performance of a
company can be valuable. The auditor can
assist in identifying information as being
either authentic or inauthentic. Further,
auditors can assess the information content
of information generated to support opposing
opinions. (For example, auditors would
compare optimistic forecasts by management
to industry forecasts, predictions concerning
the general economy, and other sources of
information concerning future company performance.) Due to the intention to persuade,
the information producers may claim to have
proven some opinion although in actuality the
data produced are devoid of, or are at best
neutral in, information content. Auditors can
help to sift through such information and
avoid the nonproductive effects of relying on
misleading information. The audit increases
the value of public information as an effective
signal of its quality by increasing the precision of the information.
Information theory analytically relates the
size of expenditures on information monitoring and evaluation (such as the expenditures
on an audit) to a consensus judgment by
market participants as to the degree of
precision associated with the information.
The implication of the observed expenditures
on auditing is that the audit is a valued device
for making the financial report more precise.
Information theory predicts that when a firm's
financial statements are believed to have a

greater degree of precision, they will be
weighted more heavily by decision makers
and can be expected to improve investment
decisions.
Public information has been classified as
good news and bad news. Obviously, from a
distributive gain or loss perspective, one's
personal investment position makes news
good or bad. However, from a total productivity perspective, it is possible to identify
good news which increases total output and
bad news which decreases total output.
Although there are incentives for individuals
to produce public information, if that information is bad news of a discovery type,
incentives exist for individuals to suppress
the dissemination of the information.
(Foreknowledge bad news presumably cannot be suppressed.) In fact, since individuals
on the whole are assumed to be risk-averse,
they would be willing to pay something to
suppress the bad information until they have
hedged themselves against the impact of the
information. Without effective hedging, large
distributive losses will be incurred, with a
greater number of losers from the wealth
transfers than winners. The distributive losses
have formed the basis for claims in the
literature that bad news through public
information may have a negative social value.
However, the redirection of total productive
resources toward more productive investment
based on bad news can yield returns apart
from losses due to wealth transfers and may
even offset the distributive losses. The point
is analogous to the detection of bankruptcy at
an earlier date leaving investors better off by
permitting investors to shift their resources
either to improve operations or to alternative
investment opportunities.
A practical barrier exists to suppressing
discovery bad news which relates to individuals' maximization of their own utility.
Whenever information is suppressed, the
private value of the information will
necessarily increase. The suppression
attempts can backfire and as individuals have
increased incentives to find out the information and trade on it for large gains, the
distributive risk of loss for the majority of
individuals increases. By applying the more
losers than winners argument, actions by
market participants to reduce secrecy and the
suppression of information through demands
for public dissemination of information can
be understood as an effective means of
lowering the distributive risks of investment.
An example of one regulation which
makes the concern for distributive risk
explicit is the restriction on insider trading by
corporate managers. Typically investments by
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managers in their own company's stock, such
as investments through stock option plans,
must be held at least six months before
reselling the shares. The rationale for holding
period restrictions is that in an efficient
market suppression of inside information is
unlikely to be effective over the long term;
hence large distributive losses to the public
from managers' trading activities are unlikely.
Given that private incentives exist to
produce and to disseminate both good and
bad news, it is unclear that regulations
mandating the production of information are
appropriate. Unless a market failure can be
demonstrated, the absence of a particular
piece of information is likely to reflect the
consensus judgment that the costs of
generating that information exceed the
benefits of its production and use, since
otherwise incentives would exist for someone
to produce the desired information.
The SEC mandated the production and
dissemination of audit reports by corporations, yet most of the corporations had
voluntarily disseminated that information
prior to the regulation. The implication of
voluntary production of public information is
that the reallocation of productive resources
and the automatic reduction of the distributional effects otherwise possible from
generating private information (for which
investors are willing to pay higher wages to
management) adequately compensate companies for the production of audit reports. A
contributing factor to the classification of
audit reports as public rather than private
information is the cost of information production. Initially, British auditors were hired by
British businessmen to monitor investments
in the United States. However, as soon as the
auditors developed professional societies
in the United States, companies themselves
began hiring auditors, making the audited
information available to investors. Often the
information was made public to noninvestors
as well. The implication of this historical
development of audited statements is that
companies have cost advantages in
generating and disseminating audited financial statements relative to individual investors.
These cost advantages coupled with
managers' valuation of the signalling effects
of audited financial statements on the total
public help to explain the commonality of
making audit results public information.
The benefits of producing audited information have been explored with little discussion of the related costs. The interaction of
auditee attributes and cost fluctuations in an
audit reflects the basic concepts of information theory already introduced. Since the
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investment in audit services will be based on
a cost-benefit comparison, it is relevant to
complete the information economics
framework by briefly discussing the cost side
of the audit decision.
D. The Costs of Auditing
The contract between an aud itee and
auditor must have terms which can be
enforced. However, an asymmetrical information problem exists. While the auditor knows
whether he has performed a professional
audit, it is difficult for the auditee (or principal
of the auditee) to distinguish a good audit
from a poor audit. To deter the adverse
selection phenomenon, CPAs have organized
professional societies, have set examination,
experience, and education requirements for
certification, and have actively enforced a
code of ethics as a means of making it
possible for an auditee to determine expertise. Accounting firms have established wellknown reputations and have participated in.
peer review and continuing education
programs to further demonstrate their commitment to performing professional audits.
The production of information by the auditor
as to his competence, necessary in light of
information theory, increases the cost of the
audit to an auditee. Obviously, the auditee
has the option of expending resources on
private information as to the competence of
an auditor and may be able to lower total
costs by, for example, choosing an auditor
who has a less well established national
reputation but is known to be of similar
quality (based on private information
sources).
The reputation of an auditor is only one
component of audit costs. The costs of the
audit have been analytically and empirically
tied to the following factors:
1. the legal environment with respect to
auditor/auditee third party liability,
affected in part by the following
characteristics:
a. the proportion of public versus
closely held auditees in an auditor's
portfolio of clients,
b. auditee size, 14
c. evidence of clients being in financial
distress, and
d. the loss experience of the auditor;
2. internal characteristics of the audit
engagement which may be called the
determinants of the degree of audit
difficulty:
a. internal control of the auditee,

b. auditee complexity, e.g., degree of
decentralization and extent of foreign
operations, and
c. characteristics of the accounting,
such as industry peculiarities;
3. the economies of staff specialization,
particularly available to large auditing
firms; and
4. the economies from industry specialization by an audit firm. 15
The general media distribute public information on the loss experience of the auditor,
including losses from litigation and client
losses due to SEC-administered penalties and
voluntary client turnover. The auditees have
private information on their internal
characteristics that are likely to influence the
audit costs. Auditing firms have incentives to
distribute public information as to who their
clients are as a means of attracting auditees
who value the auditors' industry specialization. The available public information and the
opportunity to generate private information
on the relevant cost factors imply that
auditees can select an auditor based on a
cost-benefit analysis.
In addition to selecting an auditor, the
auditee has some latitude in specifying the
extent of auditing. Although generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) represent a minimum "extent of auditing" below
which the auditee is penalized by the
issuance of an audit report that has a scope
limitation type of qualification, the auditee
can contract for extended audit tests.
The minimum standard of GAAS can be
described as an additional means of avoiding
the adverse selection phenomenon and
providing one basis for the auditee to evaluate an auditor's performance. In addition,
GAAS represents a minimum standard below
which an auditor faces legal liability responsibilities. The inference is that GAAS is a
minimum risk-sharing basis for audit contracts and complies with the basic premise of
contracting discussed in Section VII. A. 1.
The extent of auditing has been viewed
analytically as first increasing the auditee's
efforts to perform productively in the interests
of his principals and then decreasing such
efforts beyond a certain point. Such a motivation effect infers some optimal extent of
auditing with respect to the criterion of how
much effort is expended by auditees. To tie in
the prior discussion of information theory, the
degree to which the bias of information is
deterred by the audit will increase up to a
certain level of auditing and then will decline.
In other words, the threat value of the audit is
limited.

An economic rationale for the level of
auditing not deterring bias beyond a certain
point is provided by the law of diminishing
returns. Discovery of material errors, bias,
and noncompliance with GAAP is most likely
to occur up to some reasonable level of
auditing beyond which the costs are unlikely
to justify the low probability of subsequent
discovery of material misstatement of financial reports.
The final cost choice of the auditee, other
than an information and extent-of-auditing
choice, relates to internal control. The
amount of audit tests required to reach the
minimum GAAS compliance level varies with
the quality of the internal control system of
an auditee. Since the CPAs have responsibilities for maintaining their expertise over a
broad scope of services and face substantial
legal liability exposure, the costs of their
services are likely to be high relative to the
cost of having those same services performed
by an auditee's employees. The client can
improve the cost-benefit decision of contracting with an auditor by performing an ongoing analysis of the trade-offs between the
improvement of internal controls (including
the use of internal auditors) and the extent of
the external audit. Information theory clearly
suggests concern for bias when parties
lacking independence generate information.
Similarly, the fineness of information can be
decreased if there is insufficient overview by
an independent party. However, theory also
supports the ability of the auditor to rely on
good internal control systems as a
mechanism for decreasing the noise in the
accounting information, thereby lowering the
quantity of testing required by the external
auditor.

E. Synopsis
The inability of principals to easily assess
firms' performance, managers' efforts, and
auditors' performance contributes toward a
demand for professionally organized certified
public accountants to perform independent
examinations of financial statements. Without
audits, the total amount of contracting
activities would decline and the adverse
selection phenomenon would increase in
severity. Information dissemination
arrangements that balance the gains from
improved contracting (i.e., decrease the
moral hazard) against information costs have
evolved in business, and they typically
incorporate audited financial statements and
incentive schemes tied to audited performance measures.
Signalling theory formally describes the
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ability of sellers to make the quality of their
products known to investors as a means of
improving the basis for contracting. Specifically, an audit can signal less noise or error
in the financial report, greater fineness in the
reporting methods (including compliance
with GAAP), and unbiased performance
measures. Improved information affects
managers' optimal decisions in addition to
influencing the quality and selection of
financial reporting practices. While the
assumption of rational expectations, the
existence of an efficient securities market,
and the operation of the managerial labor
market constrain the degree to which agents'
actions can diverge from principals'
preferences, auditing evolved as a costbeneficial monitoring device before SEC
regulation and persists in the non-SEC
sectors to provide an improved means of
narrowing such a divergence by increasing
the principals' ability to assess agents' performance.
While incentives exist to produce both
private and public audit information, the cost
advantages to the manager in providing such
information, the legal restrictions on insider
trading, the difficulty in suppressing information dissemination, the negative effects on
most individuals from the distributive effects
of private information, and the signalling
benefits imply that audits primarily represent
the production of public information. The
incentive to overproduce public information
and the existence of fraudulent public information increase the authentication value of
the audit.
The costs of the audit reflect auditors'
actions to distinguish good audits from poor
audits, auditors' professional liability experience and current exposure to litigation,
auditees' characteristics, and the degree to
which the auditors' professional staffs specialize over time and by industry. Each of
these cost determinants relates to information
theory and can be assessed by using available public information or by generating
private information. Analytical examination of
the audit function and empirical evidence
suggests an optimal extent of auditing for an
auditee exists which encompasses a
preferred trade-off of internal controls and
the extent of the external audit, as well as an
optimum level of motivation for the auditee to
act in the principals' best interests.

Questions for Discussion
1. a. How do the essentials of contracting
influence the demand for audits?
b. Compare foreknowledge and discovery
information as means for specifying
contracting terms.
c. If only foreknowledge was available,
what would be the likely effect on
contracting activities?
2. Pure wage contracts are observed. Are
such contracts inconsistent with the claim
that contracting parties will attempt to
balance risk-sharing and incentive
effects? Explain.
3. "Substantial long-term divergence in
managers' actions and owners' preferences can persist in today's market if the
entity is unaudited." Critically comment
on the validity of this claim.
4. Provide an example of a market which

appears to exemplify a severe case of
adverse selection. Suggest a parallel to
the audit that could improve the market,
i.e., that could decrease the severity of
the adverse selection phenomenon.

5. Describe the signalling behavior of
auditors and of corporate managers.
Provide specific examples.
6. What information attributes of a cor-

poration's financial statements are influenced by the audit? Be specific,
applying appropriate terminology in your
explanations.

7. Based on your background in financial
accounting, discuss how fineness relates
to the development of accounting principles and financial reporting techniques
through time. Provide specific examples.
8. Are distributive risks relevant to both
private and public information production? Explain.
9. "While companies can be relied upon to

disseminate good news, they cannot be
expected to voluntarily disseminate bad
news." Critically comment on the validity
of this statement. Apply the theories of
rational expectations and signalling in
your analysis.
10. How does information production in the

private markets of venture capital equity
securities and of private placement for
debt securities relate to public information production?
11. "It is not possible to overproduce public
information because it is a public good."
Critically evaluate this claim.
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12. Only two companies disseminated accountants' reports on internal accounting
controls as public information prior to
1979. In 1979 the SEC issued a proposal
to require such reports. Due to overwhelming, negative reactions from the
public (including companies, auditors,
and report users in the private sector), the
Commission withdrew the proposal for a
three-year waiting period. This period is
intended to give the accounting profession adequate time to develop their own
guidelines for such reports and to encourage production of this form of public
information.
a. Is the absence of internal accounting
control reports a market failure? Explain.
b. What are the likely effects of the SEC
proposal and its subsequent
withdrawal?
c. What changes would you predict in the
cost characteristics of an audit if the
SEC proposal had been implemented?
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VIII.
The Supply of Audits
The text has presented alternative (or
complementary) explanations for the observed demand for auditing services and the
specific attributes of the audit product which
are of value to consumers. The information
economics theory that underlies the description of the determinants of a demand for
auditing provides formal support for the
hypotheses. Although the determinants of
cost fluctuations related to the auditing
service have been briefly described, the
nature of the supply of audits has not been
explored.
The standard economic analysis of the
nature of supply of a commodity typically
begins with the identification of the firm's
production function for the commodity. A
production function defines the quantity of
output as a function of various inputs, e.g.,
capital and labor. The production function
presupposes technical efficiency and managers' selection of the best combination of
inputs to produce a particular level of output.

A. Inputs and Outputs
The audit report is valued by consumers.
The value is based on the amount by which
an audit increases the probability of detection
of material errors and nonconformity with
GAAP and provides insurance to interested
parties. A by-product already cited is the
improvement of operating efficiency which
results from auditors' suggestions concerning
internal control and production operations.
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Private incentives and the presence of regulation imply the output of a "certification"
which facilitates public trading of securities,
expansion of the customer base, and
qualification for revenue sharing and similar
programs.
The inputs to the audit production function will be studied in depth throughout the
auditing course but can be typified as a
highly labor-intensive application of
generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS). The general factors of production,
labor and capital, are reflected in varied
proportions in the available auditing techniques. The factor mix decision emphasized
here focuses on the mix of audit tests applied,
given an auditee. There is variability in the
task of GAAS compliance which permits the
selection of a factor mix, with some constraints on particular inputs.
Three characteristics of any production
operation particularly affect its cost the
output rate, the contemplated total volume,
and the programmed delivery dates. Economic theory predicts that as the output rate
increases, costs increase; as total volume
increases, unit costs decrease; and the more
distant the calendar date of delivery, the
smaller the cost-within the normal range of
operations. 1 Since auditing is primarily performed on an annual basis, with auditees
commonly reporting on a calendar year-end,
the total volume of output (number of audit
reports) is concentrated in the months of

January through April. However, efforts to
lower audit costs by both auditees and
auditors are exemplified by auditees
switching to other fiscal year-ends, by the
auditor's increased application of interim
review and compliance testing techniques,
and by the reduction of fees to auditees that
do not impose a tight constraint on the
delivery date of the auditor's report. Regulators prescribe reporting deadlines which
lead to increased audit costs. The infamous
"busy season" with substantial overtime costs
(demonstrating the increased costs that
accompany an increased rate of production)
is to some extent a result of such regulation.
While a timely audit is admittedly of greater
information value, the regulations preclude a
cost-benefit assessment of an optimal
delivery date by the consumer and producer.
Large costs are involved in an initial audit
these costs relate to learning about the
enterprise. For this reason auditees have an
incentive to retain the same auditor over time.
Auditor retention creates appropriable quasirents (payments that have no effect on the
amount of the good in existence now, but
which do affect the current rate of production
and hence the amount that will exist in the
future) to auditors and auditees, depending
on how the audit fees are paid-lump sum or
annualized. The compliance with GAAS
(meaning all established standards including
specific requirements as to audit techniques,
as found in some official pronouncements)
imposes a floor below which costs cannot
fall. However, the floor is influenced by the
length of the audit relationship. For example,
the taking of physical inventory, the distribution of confirmations, the identification of
illegal payments, and the review of internal
controls are all required under GAAS and are
some of the determinants of a floor to
auditing costs. However, prior performance of
these auditing procedures will increase the
efficiency of a subsequent year's audit. The
time involved in an initial review of internal
controls relative to the time involved in a
review of changes in controls since the last
audit is one demonstration of the increased
efficiency of ongoing audit relationships. In
addition to the duration of an audit relationship, the auditor and auditee characteristics
discussed in Section VII affect auditing costs.
For example, the auditor's extent of reliance
on the auditee's internal control is a factor
mix decision by the auditor that contributes
to the variability of the GAAS-compliance
audit task and influences the cost of the
audit.
Auditing standards constrain the producers in making their factor employment

decision. The best quantity of an input, such
as a particular auditing technique, for the
accounting firm to employ will vary with the
costs and returns of employing that input. For
example, the extent to which tests of an
internal accounting control system are valued
auditing procedures depends on the costs of
performing compliance tests and on the
extent to which the tests provide an evidential
basis for issuing an audit report relative to
time spent on competing inputs, such as
substantive tests (i.e., audit tests of year-end
financial statement balances). If a standard
were set that required compliance tests of
internal accounting control regardless of
whether the tests were cost-beneficial to the
auditor, the costs of production would
increase relative to the firm's marketdetermined choice of factors (provided this
market is efficient). The extent of the increase
in costs due to auditing standards will depend
on the extent to which those setting standards have full information on auditing firms.
The costs will increase by the loss from
·employing inefficient methods. 2
The probability of discovery of material
error will eventually begin to diminish when
the extent of auditing increases. In addition
there will be a diminishing positive effect on
managers' incentives once a certain point is
reached. These two observations imply that
the supply production function will not result
in the full discovery of misstated financial
statements. In other words, an "optimal" level
of fraud and misstatement in financial
statements exists for which the costs of
detection exceed the related benefits.

B. Effects of Asymmetrical
Information
The characteristics of the output of the
audit production function, as suggested
earlier, lead to an asymmetry of information
between the auditor and the auditee (or its
principals) concerning the quality of an audit.
This factor explains, in part, the pricing of
audit services. Audit fees are largely a
function of the observable inputs of the production, i.e., the number of hours spent by
the auditors on an engagement. In addition to
numerous standards on the form of audit
reports, the input process of the audit is
emphasized in audit standard-setting with
respect to the necessary means for gathering
sufficient audit evidence and the preparation
of working papers. The evidence upon which
auditors rely in determining their assessment
of the probability of material error is recorded
in working papers as one means of making
the probability of detection more observable. 3
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The working papers provide a road map of
the auditor's decision process and the auditing techniques applied. The current emphasis on statistical sampling and analytical
review strengthens the ability to determine
quantitatively how the samples investigated
during an audit affect the probability of
material errors going undetected.
Other means to assure that the essential
inputs, such as compliance with GAAS,
actually enter the audit process and are made
observable via the working papers' record of
evidence are the enforcement of licensing
requirements and professional ethics and the
process of peer review. Although quality
issues are the primary focus of GAAS, little
doubt exists that the working paper evidence
provides a basis for determining whether the
quantity and quality of the audit work are
adequate. Further, some of the GAAS requirements relate to observable inputs which
provide overt evidence to the auditee that an
audit has been performed, including confirmation and inventory procedures. In fact, the
typical practice of the auditors performing
most of the audit procedures on the premises
of the auditee, while primarily explained by
practicality and convenience, enhances the
observability of the audit as well as the threat
value of the audit to the auditee's employees.

C. Potential Barriers to Entry
It would be inappropriate to highlight the
observability qualities of licensing requirements without acknowledging that such
practices can have anti-competitive effects.
However, the "certified" accountants
historically have competed with other accountants, suggesting that the certification is
primarily a signalling device, rather than a
restrictive barrier to entry. 4 The economics
literature formally supports the concept that
an agency which certifies that a private
individual has certain skills, yet does not
prevent, in any way, the practice of these
skills in any occupation by people who do not
have a certificate provides a quality signal
that does not result in the special producer
group (e.g., CPAs) holding a monopoly
position at the expense of the rest of the
public. 5 Although the practices of non-CPAs
are constricted under current legislation, an
historical perspective suggests non-CPAs
have been allowed to compete with CPAs.
Not only is there no prevention of practice
by non-CPAs, there is ample opportunity to
become a CPA. The requirements to become
certified do not represent substantial barriers
to entry in the sense that the requirements
would likely be met by typical professional
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training and practice in the absence of the
certification standards. An effective monopoly position for CPAs via barriers to entry will
not evolve under conditions of competition by
non-CPAs and the setting of licensing standards at an average level of expected
professional knowledge.
Ironically, a barrier to entry into the CPA
profession has evolved as a by-product of
regulation. This barrier relates to the development and support of current expertise for
audits and related specialized services. Just
to keep up with the regulators' pronouncements requires a substantial commitment to
training, support facilities with reference
materials, and elaborate information systems.
This commitment, which grows with government regulation, can make it difficult for small
accounting firms to be economically feasible
operations. In addition, since the awards for
legal liability are unrelated to the auditor's
fees, a small auditing firm with physical
limitations to diversifying its risk (particularly
given the aforementioned limitations on
professional liability insurance coverage
available to an auditor at reasonable cost)
can find it extremely difficult to provide
auditing services. The difficulty increases as
the regulation of client companies increases.
While in the absence of regulation small
auditing firms would face competition from
larger firms with economies of scale, 6 intervention by government, including
numerous disclosure requirements, has increased such economies.
Even the effective barrier to the entry of
small accounting firms imposed by the
quantity of government regulation and the
resultant prevalence of large auditing firms in
both the unregulated and regulated markets
does not suggest an absence of competition.
In fact, no evidence exists of price fixing or
market-sharing, and empirically there is
evidence of price competition among firms 7
and a number of auditor changes by
auditees. 8 The concentration of public accounting firms9 appears to be largely attributable to economies of scale in serving
large auditees, in permitting the industry
specialization of professional staff, and in
meeting the educational demands that
primarily stem from government regulations.

D. Synopsis
The audit was an economically feasible
method of monitoring that was demanded
before 1934. The total supply of auditing
services obviously has fluctuated with the
availability and cost of labor inputsinfluenced by such factors as competing

offers from purchasers of accounting labor
other than auditing firms and the availability
of accounting training at universities-and
the total growth in economic transactions. 10
The nature of the supply of audits has been
briefly described, including the claimed anticompetitive effects of licensing and of
government regulation. Having focused
primarily on the demand for and supply of
audits in an unregulated environment, attention must be paid to the general effects of
regulation to gain a thorough understanding
of the economic role of the audit in both free
and regulated markets.
Growth in regulation has been claimed to
be an important determinant of demand and
has undeniably led to an increase in the
number of audits by regulated companies.
Whether regulation increases the total supply
of auditing depends on the strength of two
opposing forces. Since regulation simultaneously raises the cost of production and
increases the demand for audits, it is theoretically ambiguous as to what overall effect
regulation has had on the quantity of auditing
services. However, effects of specific types of
accounting and auditing regulations on the
quantity of auditing (and complementary)
services demanded can be identified, as
discussed in Section IX.

Questions for Discussion
1. List the primary inputs to the audit pro-

duction function. Do capital investments
pose a barrier to entry into the auditing
profession? Elaborate.

2. Regulation has increased the amount of
audit services produced in the economy.
Critically comment.

3. Ng, David S., "Supply and Demand for
Auditing Services and the Nature of
Regulations in Auditing." The Accounting
Establishment in Perspective-Proceedings
of the Arthur Young Professors' Roundtable
1978, Sidney Davidson, ed., Virginia: The
Council of Arthur Young Professors, 1979.
4. Edwards, James Don, "The Emergence of

Public Accounting in the United States, 17481895." The Accounting Review, January
1954, pp. 52-63.
5. Friedman, Milton, "Occupational Licensure."
Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1962.
6. Hirshleifer, Jack, Price Theory, California:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976.
7. Rhode, John Grant and Paul A. Griffin,
"Professional Performance of Certified
Public Accountants: Evidence on the Quality
of Auditing Services." Research Paper No.
455, Stanford University, June 1978.
8. Coe, Teddy L. and Dan Palmon, "Some
Consideration on Auditor Turnover" (and
"Discussant's Comments" by Wanda A.
Wallace). Collected Papers of the American
Accounting Association's Annual Meeting,
Honolulu, Hawaii: August 21-25, 1979, pp.
484-496.
9. Rhode, John Grant, Gary M. Whitsell, and
Richard L. Kelsey, "An Analysis of ClientIndustry Concentrations for Large Public
Accounting Firms." The Accounting Review,
October 1974, pp. 772-787.
10. Pashigian, Peter, "The Market for Lawyers: The
Determinants of the Demand for and Supply
of Lawyers." The Journal of Law and
Economics, April 1977, pp. 53-85.

3. a. Assume that the government eliminated

all non-common law regulations affecting auditing services. How would this
action affect the market for auditing
services?
b. Assume that private standard-setting
was also eliminated. How would this
affect the market for auditing services?
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IX.
A look at Regulation
While it is not possible theoretically to
state the effect of regulation on the total
demand for auditing services, it is possible to
draw analogies between the nature of regulation in the auditing sector and other government regulation. Such analogies facilitate an
understanding of regulation's influence on
the market for auditing services. The purpose
of this section is to make the reader cognizant of a possible divergence in the intent of
regulation and the effect of regulation, as well
as a possible divergence in politicians' selfinterests and the public interest. The issues
raised are oversimplified and the consideration of additional economic issues with an
application of other analytical tools would
generate a more powerful analysis. However,
a brief introduction to the economics of
regulation in general and to SEC and
accounting regulation in particular (with a
focus on how regulation affects auditing) is
provided in the hopes that the interested
reader will further investigate relevant issues.

A. A Price Floor Effect
An audit requirement, particularly when
combined with increases in minimum
auditing standards, can be expected to have a
market effect similar to a price floor (a price
above the price in an unregulated market).
When a price floor is set and is operative, the
quantity demanded will decline. The decline
in the demand for audit services could be
reflected in a greater number of companies
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choosing not to "go public" or in a decrease
in demand for complementary services, such
as budget planning. Empirical evidence
demonstrates that the quantity of private
(direct) placements increased rapidly after
the SEC Act of 1934. 1

B. Input or Tax Subsidization
Changes in auditing standards can be
compared to a subsidy by government of one
of the inputs to production or to a tax subsidy
by government, depending on the nature of
the auditing standard being prescribed. Any
input subsidy will alter the nature and shape
of the audit production function. If the
subsidy is an input (an audit procedure) that
is not effective in generating greater output in
the form of a greater probability of detecting
misstatements, the subsidy can have an effect
similar to rationing. In other words, if the
price pressure on total auditors' services is
sufficient to preclude compliance with the
ineffective standard by carrying out current
auditing procedures, the requirement can
operate as a physical rationing of available
audit assurance and decrease the welloffness of consumers. (Of course the
possibility exists of noncompliance with
required ineffective standards as an alternative to providing lower overall audit
assurance. However, any deviation from
GAAS could cause the auditor difficulty in
demonstrating that he had performed an
examination with due audit care.)

Evidence suggests that price pressure
does exist. Survey findings that 93 percent of
corporate respondents in the U.S. have an
ongoing program to minimize or control the
amount of audit fees support a real concern
by auditees over the costs of auditing
services, 2 and consequently substantial
pressure by auditees to reduce audit fees.
While the price pressure does not necessarily
result from the subsidization of ineffective
inputs via GAAS, the mere existence of such
pressures implies that increased costs cannot
be easily passed on to consumers.
If GAAS merely reinforces existing practice and requires that an essential effective
procedure be performed, the regulation
would be more analogous to a tax subsidy by
government. Given that a procedure is
already performed, a legal requirement for its
performance would tend to make the demand
for it inelastic and could yield increased
output. Further, an effective procedure,
applied more frequently, can lead to lower
prices. 3 (The lowered prices would reflect the
lower cost from imposing effective audit
procedures on otherwise inefficient auditors.)
The critical determinant of whether GAAS
that prescribe specific auditing techniques
decrease or increase the total demand for
audits depends on the wisdom of the
regulators in their selection of auditing
techniques to mandate.

C. Rationing Effect
Explicit rationing has been observed in
government actions which officially discourage the provision of certain services. For
example, until 1973 SEC companies were not
permitted to provide forecasts. In fact, the
SEC has with few exceptions suppressed
projections, values, and other soft information. This attitude has only changed recently
with the SEC's encouragement, and
sometimes requirement, of forward-looking
information on replacement accounting,
forecasts, reserve accounting, and price-level
adjustments.
The SEC has had a preoccupation with
insider trading, and inequitable information
dissemination has led to enactment of the
"theology of jumping the gun." By actively
restricting the early dissemination of information (sometimes called market conditioning),
the SEC has, in effect, ignored the reality of
outside information and the temporal advantage of early dissemination (viz., earlier
reallocation of resources). In addition, if such
suppression motivates outsiders to produce
information that they would otherwise not
produce (since they produce it less efficient-

ly), the regulatory action induces avoidable
information-production costs.
The restriction of certain types of information does not have to be explicit to generate a
rationing effect. If liability exposure is substantial (as is the case for professional parties
to security transactions under the securities
acts), production of certain information by
the most efficient producers may be
deterred. 4

D. Auditing Standards
Specific auditing standards can have
effects upon demand, costs, and supply of
auditing services. Analogies drawn between
accounting/auditing standard-setting and
more general classes of regulation describe a
framework for analyzing the effects of a
particular standard. However, a more global
approach to assessing the effects of standardsetting addresses the decision process of any
private or public regulatory body. Rule by
committee or board decisions necessarily
depends on the wisdom of the selected rulemakers. A mandated disclosure system, as
well as a mandated audit process, runs into
complicated problems of relevance and
choice stemming from the variety of auditees
and the different backgrounds and "needs" of
the users. These problems are likely to result
in the setting of some ineffective standards
that either do not fulfill the desired objectives
or do so in an inefficient manner. How many
ineffective standards result will depend on the
extent to which those setting standards have
full information. Not only must standardsetters evaluate auditing techniques, but they
must also try to balance users' needs. The
balance reached is unlikely to compare
favorably to the balance that could be
reached in the market.
The mandating of audit standards is
equivalent to suppressing access to the
market and free negotiation of prices. The
result is a rise in costs and a reduction in the
extent of mutually preferred exchanges
among contracting parties. For example, if
principals and managers of a small firm are
not interested in disclosures concerning
pensions, leases, contingencies, and related
parties, yet want an unqualified or "clean"
audit report, they cannot contract for such a
service. The "one GAAP for all" approach of
standard-setting, enforced by auditors,
precludes such contracting and appears
particularly burdensome for the smaller
companies. 5 Although a social contract with
report users exists, in addition to a technical
contract between specific parties, it is doubtful that information found to be largely
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irrelevant or not cost-beneficial by contracting parties would be useful to some unidentified third party if costs are appropriately
considered.
The extent to which access to the market
is suppressed is largely a function of the
detail of standard-setting. A characterization
of accounting and auditing regulation differs
along the specificity-generality continuum.
Generality refers to standards that set a
reasonable criterion on which to judge
relevance. In contrast, specificity refers to
rules which withdraw from the decision
maker's consideration one or more of the
circumstances that would be relevant to the
decision according to a standard. The
difference between a rule and a standard is a
matter of degree-the degree of precision.
Accounting guidelines tend to be fairly
specific, detailed disclosure requirements,
whereas auditing standards are general in the
sense of stressing objectives instead of the
means of reaching those objectives. While
auditors enforce accounting regulations
through the reporting of noncompliance, the
implication to be drawn from a precision
comparison of accounting and auditing
standards is that the cost imposed on society
by accounting regulation is greater than that
imposed by auditing regulation. The larger
cost results from allowing less flexibility in
the extent to which mutually preferred
exchanges are permitted between auditor and
auditee regarding reporting and accounting
methods relative to auditing processes. The
requirement of "one GAAP for all" is more of
an accounting regulatory constraint than an
auditing constraint, although it affects the
content of the auditor's report. Since rules are
easier and cheaper to enforce than standards,6 the question arises as to why
regulators and the profession have
systematically differed in their treatment of
accounting and auditing standard-setting.
One argument is that accounting
statements are frequently compared for
investment decisions whereas audit
processes are not, implying some value to
detailed uniformity. A second argument is
that the nature of the audit, specifically the
requirement that the audit be tailored to the
client's characteristics, precludes specifying
detailed audit procedures. If this is so, why do
some specific procedures like inventory
observation and accounts receivable confirmation become a part of the standards? The
well-known answer to these examples is
litigation. The profession mandated these
procedures based on the McKesson & Robbins court case, which charged that CPAs
had done inadequate audit work by not
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performing these particular audit techniques.
The standards have been hypothesized to be
a means for the auditing profession to
establish a legal defense of "due care." Yet
the substantial generality in standards causes
one to question this hypothesis. Regardless
of the degree to which a motivation for
detailed standards for legal defense exist, the
costs of prescribing detailed audit techniques
and the extent to which the techniques are to
be applied apparently outweigh, in the view of
the private standard-setting board, the
benefits of extensive specificity. However,
individual firms do set detailed auditing
"standards" (rules) which are likely to be an
important feature of legal regulation. Such
rules represent the generally accepted practice of the profession, a measure of due care.
The question remains: why don't the
private and public regulators set detailed
standards? According to the insurance
hypothesis, the use of standards, as opposed
to rules, bears benefits to both private and
government regulators. Generality permits
the government to claim the inadequacy of
auditing procedures in the wake of trouble,
and the standard-setting boards can likewise
avoid blame, since the litigation claim rests
on the auditor's judgment within the prescribed standards. Materiality, a concept infamous for its vagueness, has been cited in the
literature as a very effective shield used by
the SEC against criticism. In fact, the SEC
has even argued that any detailed guideline
for regulation "would be a blueprint for
fraud." The strength of such an insurance
motivator for ambiguity in regulations will
rest on whether regulators are active in
promoting their self-interestor the public
interest.

E. Regulators: Self-Interest
Maximizers?
Recently, there have been challenges to
the argument that government represents the
public interest.7 While politicians have always
assumed other individuals act in their own
self-interest, they have claimed that they are
different and that, as regulators, they act in
the public interest. However, the behavior of
politicians and regulators is not well explained if a researcher assumes that the
regulator acts in the public interest. In fact,
recent analyses of the political process which
assume politicians maximize their own utility
have demonstrated an ability to explain
observed behavior. 8 Obviously, the maximization of one's own utility does not preclude
actions in the public interest. However,
conflicts between the public interest and self-

interest are likely to arise. The inability of
public-interest rationales to explain some
regulatory behavior suggests that the
hypothesis of utility maximization is more
consistent with available evidence than is the
hypothesis of public interest maximization. 9

F. "Free-Riders": A Tax Effect
The acknowledgment that politicians are
self-interest maximizers suggests a free-rider
nature of regulation. The free-rider problem,
as discussed in an earlier section, refers to
the fact that some individuals who have not
paid for a commodity cannot be excluded
from its use. The commodity most likely has
some public good attributes, i.e., use by one
party does not diminish use by another party.
The literature has discussed the free-rider
incentives of financial analysts. 10 However,
the analysts are not the only potential freeriders who request information that might not
be produced if subjected to a "public interest"
cost-benefit evaluation. Information useful to
government in performing its responsibilities,
e.g., enforcing anti-trust legislation and
monitoring compliance with varied agencies'
prescriptions, can be obtained through disclosure regulation with payment imposed on
the current and future stockholders of public
corporations. These costs, in part, may be
passed on to consumers (depending on the
elasticity of demand for the corporations'
products). Some regulations essentially conscript CPAs for government enforcement
activities. With the ability to subsidize government operations by shifting enforcement
responsibilities to CPAs, regulators can
maximize their utility, including their leisure
time and their performance measures, incurring few direct costs, simply by regulating
auditors. At the same time, the regulators can
justify the expansion of the budget and the
power of the SEC by passing numerous
guidelines and by reprimanding those CPA
firms that are blamed for the financial
troubles of auditees or shareholders. While
such action would clearly be justified on a
cost-benefit basis from the self-interest
perspective of legislators, this criterion is
unlikely to match the "public interest"
criterion claimed when implementing
regulations. Any divergence of "public interest" and "regulators' self-interest" has the
effect of a tax. As always, taxes transfer
wealth from both consumers and producers
to government. The tax is hidden in the sense
that companies don't pay the government
directly but instead incur information and
auditing costs that reflect the public interest
and the regulators' interest. In addition, there

is an efficiency loss due to a reduction in the
volume of trade, analogous to any tax effect.
If the insurance hypothesis holds, the
numerous regulations that expand the scope
of auditors' responsibilities and impose costs
of implementation will correspond to the
expansion of regulators' perceived responsibilities. If price pressure again precludes a
simple addition of the requirements to
existing audit procedures (i.e., demand is not
perfectly inelastic and the auditor is unwilling
to perform the additional procedure at the
same price), the diverting of auditors' attention away from the financial statement
information can result in less output (either a
lower assurance level or fewer audits). The
output related to the expanded scope combined with less of the output available prior to
the additional regulation, could be of greater
net value, but this outcome would imply a
cost-benefit justification process in
regulation-setting, with an emphasis on the
public interest. The self-interest evidence is
increasing, and evidence of careful costbenefit assessments by regulators is lacking.
Not only is the SEC capable of avoiding
blame and shifting enforcement responsibility
(through the use of private boards as the
principal standard-setters}, but it is also able
to avoid explicit cost-benefit assessment
responsibilities through reliance on the
private sector. For example, if the SEC had
called for segmental financial reporting
instead of pressuring the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to require such
reports, it would have been obliged to
evaluate alternative reporting schemes, draft
a specific proposal, and then invite comments
on the draft. Yet, even the draft comment
process does not guarantee an objective
cost-benefit analysis, since the SEC has been
known to pay limited attention to strong
opposition in comment letters received,
dismissing them as coming from interested
parties. A recent example of problems with
the cost-benefit evaluation procedures of the
SEC is provided by the SEC proposal to
require reports on internal accounting control. The initial proposal's time frame was
unrealistic as indicated by the decision to
table the 1979 reporting requirements. An
overwhelming, negative response to the
proposal (over 950 letters) and the specific
criticisms voiced further suggest that there
was inadequate investigation of relevant
issues during the proposal formulation stage.
Finally, despite a three-year waiting period
before further action in this area, the SEC has
made it clear that if the private sector does
not act, the Commission will. The SEC's
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statement of the need for internal accounting
control reports in spite of preparers', users',
and auditors' negative comments on the
proposal suggests only limited attention has
been paid to public comments. 11
The free-rider attributes of information 12
provide one explanation for the expanding
scope of regulation. In light of the free-rider
potential for regulators, the freedom of such
regulatory bodies as the SEC to prescribe
accounting and auditing regulations could be
costly. If the regulators' role was restricted to
enforcement rather than standard-setting and
enforcement, the costs related to regulators'
activities as free-riders could be expected to
be lower.

G. Publicity and Attention
The insurance incentive of government to
require audits has already been addressed, as
has the incentive to subsidize government
operations. In addition to these incentives,
publicity and attention are important factors
that motivate legislators to set regulations. 13
Typically, crusades on moralistic issues like
questionable payments and perks have
prevailed. For example, the publicity
surrounding post-Watergate revelations of
questionable or illegal payments apparently
precipitated (or at least provided a rationale
for) the attention paid by Senator Metcalf and
Representative Moss to the accounting
profession. 14 The auditing standard regarding illegal payments, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), and the SEC's proposed reporting on internal control all
appear to relate to the attention opportunity
provided by the illegal payments issue. 15 The
propriety of claiming that the FCPA was a
reaction to a moral cause rather than a costbenefit based decision can be assessed by
reviewing subsequent analysis of the Act's
effects. The costs of the FCPA have been
estimated by a White House task force
assigned to study the effects of the 1977 law
to include a $1 billion a year loss from U.S.
trade abroad. The offsetting benefits of the
Act remain unclear, 16 but there is empirical
evidence that the illegal payments had no
statistically significant effect on investorsY

H. Old laws Never Die?
The benefits of each auditing regulation
require individual study to ascertain whether
the requirement is in the "public interest."
In contrast, at least one attribute of regulation
imposes costs which are evident in all sectors
of the political process and can be particularly costly to the auditing production function
in light of the dynamic nature of business and
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the technological innovations in auditing. 18
Unlike private companies, regulators do
not benefit from resources saved when
unnecessary regulations are removed.
Regulators appear to be conservative in the
sense that old regulations frequently continue
even when they appear to be no longer
useful. The rigidity of the auditing production
function (implied by regulation of inputs) will
decrease the auditor's flexibility in adapting
to new technology and to shifts in the relative
costs of inputs. An even more acute problem
could exist in the accounting rule-setting
process due to the specificity of rulings. As
old standards are retained and new ones
added, the prospect and possibility of actual
enforcement and enforceability will tend to
decline, given constraints on regulators'
budgets. This will lead to selective enforcement of the law, i.e., discriminatory enforcement by those in power, which results in
wealth transfers away from the selected
violators of the law. Those selected cannot
afford to persist in a disagreement with the
Commission due to the high costs of delay
and of the adverse publicity surrounding a
new stock or bond issue; hence, the costs to
selected violators are likely to be substantial.
The magnitude of the cost of a regulator's
incentive structure that does not reward for
removing regulations is an empirical question. Although the SEC lifted its requirement
for replacement cost accounting when price
level reporting requirements were set by the
private sector, contrary examples of redundant and/or conflicting rules, such as the
reported problems of codifying the securities
regulations, exist. Regardless of the costs
involved, the incentive structure of regulators
has a theoretical flaw relative to the private
sector. (Note that this analysis assumes that
no unidentified benefits exist that equal or
exceed such costs.)

I. A Means of Forestalling Regulation
As already discussed, regulation tends to
increase the demand for audits as a vehicle to
subsidize government operations, to qualify
for "going public," and to expand the
customer base. However, another potential
effect of existing SEC requirements is the
encouragement of voluntary audits in the
unregulated sector as a means of forestalling
regulation and quieting the press. This is a
competing explanation of widespread voluntary audits in the municipal sector. Similarly,
the privately formed auditing and accounting
standards are frequently described as means
of deterring SEC regulation. The conclusion
to be drawn-and a very important conclu-

sian for one undertaking an analysis of the
economics of the audit function-is that it is
difficult to extract the effects of regulation
from the effects of the free market. However,
the historical evidence of pre-regulation
audits cannot be attributed to the auditee's
desire to forestall regulation, despite the
potential explanation of audits observed in
the non-SEC sector since 1934.

J. Synopsis
The benefits of regulation are claimed to
center on improved resource allocation
issues. For example, the literature is full of
claims that regulation restricts the opportunities to exploit inside information, reduces
unnecessary duplication of efforts, resolves
the free-rider problem that is not resolved by
the market due to difficulties in enforcing the
rule of excluding nonpurchasers, and
resolves issues concerning the discriminatory
terms of trade in the market for information
due to differential costs of or opportunities
for information production (e.g., the firm's
monopoly position over information about
itself). However, these claims are not
necessarily met through existing regulation,
nor is regulation the sole means of addressing resource allocation issues. In fact,
since regulation requires a mechanism for
making optimal (or at least better) information production decisions, which are in turn
imposed on firms, and for efficiently disseminating the produced information-nontrivial tasks-regulation may not be the
preferred arrangement.
By permitting the free market to operatewith voluntary trading and an assessment of
the costs of disclosures and auditing
procedures in light of the monitoring, information, and insurance benefits derived-the
amount of audit services supplied in the
unregulated economy could result in an
optimal allocation of resources. In addition,
the normal operations of a free market system
can be expected to enforce contracts on a
more uniform basis than government
regulators enforce their policies, given
budget limitations.
In this "look at regulation" the costs of
regulation have been focused upon along
with the incentives of regulators in order to
understand the specific effects of regulation
on the audit product. The choice between a
market or a regulatory mechanism for resolving identified problems in reaching the
optimal level of information production is a
continuing decision process as each issue is
considered by the political sector. It is hoped

this instrument will allow you to critically
evaluate arguments both for and against
proposed regulation.

Questions for Discussion
1. Explain how regulations over accounting
and auditing services are analogous to
government programs which impose a
price floor, ration output, or assess taxes.
What other similarities exist between
accounting and auditing regulation and
other government activities?
2. Who are the potential free-riders of mandated audits?
3. Compare and contrast accounting regulation with auditing regulation. Suggest a
possible explanation for a difference in the
regulation of accounting and auditing.
4. Discuss the plausibility of the claim that
government regulation of accounting and
auditing is required due to the "market
failures" that arise from public good
attributes of information, redundant
production of information, and managers'
"monopoly" over information. (Refer to
Sections IV and VII in formulating your
responses.)
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X.
Summary
Economic incentives exist for parties to
have and to supply an audit. The auditing
process makes the terms of a contract
sufficiently observable to facilitate specialization by agents, diversification of principals'
resources, and increased productivity. The
audit fulfills three explicit demands: a demand for a monitoring mechanism, a demand
for information production to improve investors' decisions, and a demand for insurance to protect against losses from
distorted information. Joint products of the
audit include cost savings in operations
stemming from suggestions by the auditor for
improved operating efficiency, lower costs
from property and bonding insurance, reduced loss from errors, lower costs for
complementary services, and regulatory compliance. In explaining, marketing, and
deciding to contract for an audit, these
insights will provide an analytical basis for
describing and evaluating those attributes of
the product which are relevant to the decision
process. The supply of auditing reflects those
attributes of auditing which are valued by
consumers, including the "observability" of
audit quality. Examples of supply responses
to demand in the free market include:
1. professional certification,
2. professional liability responsibilities,
3. the tailoring of the audit to the auditee's
system,
4. the trade-offs available to auditees
through limited substitution of im-

proved controls for external audit fees,
5. the provision of complementary services, and
6. the collection and documentation of
quantitative evidence that a sufficient
amount of auditing was performed to
provide the basis for forming an opinion
on the fairness of financial statements.
Political and regulatory issues related to
the audit frequently stem from claims that
market failures have occurred due to the
public good nature of information and the
monopolistic position of the firm in the
production of information about its own
performance. Market incentives to produce
public information have been outlined. The
costs of regulation have been described, with
recognition that politicians' activities may not
necessarily be in the public interest.
Presumably you are now aware of the
controversy which surrounds the production
of accounting and auditing information and
understand the role of the audit in the
regulated environment. The mandated audit
not only serves as a regulatory tool to
disseminate public information, which was
similarly disseminated in the unregulated
market, but also provides insurance to
regulators that information useful to government in performing its responsibilities is
automatically provided.
Empirical questions concerning whether
regulation has increased the demand for
auditing services persist due to the obvious
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concurrent increases in the cost of the
auditing process that have resulted from
regulation. Claims that auditing is prevalent
due to regulation are inconsistent with the
existence of audits prior to regulation.
However, the possibility exists that the
government's intervention in formulating
accounting and auditing standards and in
expanding liability responsibilities has
decreased the total demand for audits.
Regulations may have made the current
production process economically unfeasible
for smaller, unregulated entities which do not
face the inelastic demand curve imposed by
regulation. The recent professional standard
which permits "compilation and review services" (financial statement preparation and
limited review) by CPAs may well evidence a
demand by this unregulated sector for some
professional services by the CPA as a limited
substitute for the high priced audits that
necessarily reflect production costs imposed
by regulators. The analysis of the demand for
compilation and review services is just one
example of how an understanding of the audit
product and its roles in the free market and
the regulated environment permits the
analysis of current events that affect
professional practice.
An important facet of your study of
auditing is to understand the product in its
current environment. With this theoretical
framework for viewing the audit function you
will now explore the details of the audit
production function which necessarily reflect
actions by the private standard-setting
boards, regulators, and the courts as they
have defined the duties and responsibilities of
the auditor. Critically evaluate the degree to
which existing guidelines contribute to the
various outputs of the auditing process by
applying the framework described herein.
This approach to learning the details of
auditing will insure an in-depth understanding of the audit product and the underlying
process of supplying that product.
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